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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the level of initial returns and long-term 
performance of A-series initial public offerings in China’s stock markets. The data used 
for this purpose cover 131 initial public offerings issued in either Shanghai (SHSE) or in 
Shenzhen (SHZE) stock exchange, during 2010–2012. This quantity of initial public 
offerings accounts for 12,04 % of all issued IPOs in research years. 
Examination of initial returns is completed with market-adjusted returns, in order to find 
the development of underpricing phenomena. Market-adjusted buy-and-hold period 
returns and wealth relatives are used in researching the holding period returns of 6-, 12-, 
24- and 36-month. Market-adjusted holding period returns are tested with Student’s t-test 
in order to define their statistical significance. Regression analyses are used in testing the 
statistical significance and explanatory power of firm specific characteristics. 
The empirical results of this study are unable to editorialize to the level of initial returns, 
as the results are in contradiction with previous studies. Instead, the results about the long-
term performance of initial public offerings indicate them to be poor long-term 
investments, as those underperformed their benchmarks: SSE & SSH composite indices. 
Cross-sectional regression results indicate that there is a strong positive relationship 
between price-to-earnings ratio and long-term performance. Furthermore, a strong 
negative relationship between market-adjusted initial returns and long-term performance 
is documented in this empirical research. 
 
Key Words: Initial public offering, Underpricing, Long-term Performance, China
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offering (IPO), is the first public equity issue done by a company. This issue 
takes place after company’s decision to go public. The IPO allows the trading with the 
stocks of this specific company in the exchange where the stocks are quoted. Initial return 
is generally defined as the first day return, the difference between the offering price in the 
IPO and first day close-price. The initial return is the most common indicator for 
underpricing, although markets’ overvaluation can affect high initial returns as well, 
consequently distorting the assessment of the underpricing. (Carter & Manaster 1990: 
1045.) 
The underpricing of initial public offerings is documented by an extensive literature 
around the globe. The most common method for defining the underpricing is to examine 
the initial returns: the difference between offer price and first day close price. As 
underpriced, the IPOs experience significant first day returns, i.e. strong positive initial 
returns. Commonly it has been a short-term phenomenon, however, the extent of this 
phenomenon is not unambiguous. In some circumstances, as in hot market conditions the 
underpricing might last months and the initial returns are much higher, whereas in other 
circumstances and environments the phenomenon might not exist. (Ritter 1991: 3–4.) As 
widely documented anomaly, there are multiple theories explaining this short-term 
underpricing, which can roughly be divided into four categories: theories based on 
asymmetric information, behavioral theories, institutional theories and last theories based 
on ownership, control and monitoring.    
Another anomaly related to the initial public offerings is their poor long-term 
performance. IPOs have usually underperformed their benchmarks in the long-term, as 
the most common explanations for the underperformance are usually pseudo market 
timing (hot market conditions) and overoptimismn & fads. Due to the speculation and 
underpricing of IPOs, there is strong interest in the markets towards IPOs, as investors 
are interested in taking advantage of the short-term underpricing. On the other hand, 
issuing companies might be willing to take advantage of optimistic markets in order to 
raise maximal gross proceeds, by issuing their IPOs at certain time when markets are in 
upturn. As a result, the speculation and thus strong demand drives the prices even higher, 
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further away from their fundamental value. This short-term overvaluation lasts till 
investors in the market realize the companies are not as profitable as they thought, causing 
the prices to fall as the fads fade away. Consequently, the IPOs surrounded by speculation 
and fads have higher probability to face poor long-term performance, as multiple studies 
have revealed the high initial returns have a negative and significant relationship with 
long-term performance, creating a link between these two anomalies. (Ritter 1991: 3–6; 
Schultz 2003: 483–485.) An extensive empirical literature has also documented several 
other causalities regarding to IPOs, which will be presented further in this study. 
Su & Fleisher (1999) were one of the first to examine the underpricing of Chinese A-
series IPOs, and the average initial returns were 948,59 % during 1987–1995, as the 
maximum individual initial return was 38300 %. Throughout the years the level of initial 
returns has weakened, however still being strongly positive. Numerous studies conducted 
in China have also revealed that initial public offerings have been poor long-term 
investments (Chen, Firth & Kim 2000; Chan, Wang & Wei 2004; Su & Bangassa 2011). 
Hence, researching these two anomalies and their current states in China is interesting 
due to the unique markets and circumstances. 
The history of Chinese IPOs started in mid-1980s, as the first initial public offering was 
issued as a part of an experimental joint stock system (Guo & Brooks 2008: 985). 
Nowadays, the IPO markets in China composes from two stock exchanges: Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, which were established in the early 1990s. The changes in the economic 
circumstances of China were substantial, as for the first time, companies had an 
alternative opportunity – raise capital from the markets. (Mok & Hui 1998: 454). As of 
then, the economy of China has been in significant upturn, by raising more than 8 % 
annually for the next 20 years when measured in GDP growth. Simultaneously it reflects 
the successful economic reform. (Wan & Yuce 2007: 367).  
Nowadays, there exist two types shares subjected to trading in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges, A-shares and B-shares. The A-shares are generally available only for 
domestic Chinese investors, however as of 2002 there has been an exception: qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFII) have been allowed to participate to China’s capital 
markets directly. Otherwise the stocks are exclusively for mainland Chinese. The other 
type of share, B-share, which was established in Shanghai stock exchange in 1992, is 
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exclusively for foreign investors and the shares are quoted in U.S. dollars. The purpose 
of establishing the B-shares was to attract foreign capital, investors, and transform the 
management of companies held by mostly foreign institutional investors. Due to the 
differences between A- and B-shares, the markets are segmented and regulations and 
restrictions regarding to shares are unequal. (Mok & Hui 1998: 453–474; Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 2016.) 
China has begun to play a key role in the global economy and its economy became the 
largest in Asia and the second largest in the entire world during the last decade, losing 
only to United States. Despite the rapid growth and importance in global economy, there 
still exist unique phenomena and circumstances are strongly different, distinguishing 
them from western financial markets. For instance, the regulatory environment is strongly 
in the hands of Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). During the past they 
have regulated the pricing, allocation, timing and other features of IPOs, as a result being 
an important stakeholder in IPO markets. One of the most important regulations has been 
the pricing of IPOs, till June 2009 the pricing had been based on different kind of 
equations, lastly in P/E ratio which was not allowed to exceed 15, afterwards all pricing 
regulations were deregulated. (Chan, Wang & Wei 2004; IMF 2015; Tian 2011: 78; Yu 
& Tse 2006: 381.) As showed further, the actions and regulations taken and set by CSRC 
have strongly affected to initial public offerings, strengthening the initial returns directly 
and indirectly. 
During the recent years, China’s economy has also experienced major afflictions. The 
indices soared exceptionally high since mid-2014 to June 2015, as most of the indices 
rose more than twice. However, the upturn changed to severe tailspin in summer 2015. 
All stock indices plunged intensely, causing the Central Bank of China to intervene 
markets and taking control over them. As a result, trading was ceased for over a month in 
parts of the exchanges, and in August 2015, Yuan Renminbi got devaluated twice.  
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The figure 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics regarding to the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges, by presenting the quantity of companies in exchanges, average P/E 
ratios and total market capitalization of stock exchanges. As the figures present, the recent 
years have affected to both of them and the differences between exchanges have 
increased, especially the difference between average P/E ratios became massive. Thus, 
differences between exchanges about the long-term performance might occur.   
 
  
 
Figure 1.) Development of market capitalization, average P/E ratios and the quantity of companies in 
Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2010-2016. (Shanghai Stock Exchange 2016; Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 2016; Siblis Research 2016.) 
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1.1. Purpose of the study and limitations 
As briefly presented above, the average initial returns in China have been 948,59 % 
during 1987–1995, however substantially decreased by years 2006–2011, being approx. 
66 %. Furthermore, pricing regulations regarding to the IPOs have stood till June 2009, 
when all rules around pricing were deregulated. The regulations related to pricing has 
increased the initial returns, as investors were aware that the initial returns were going to 
be sky high. Hence, there was a strong speculation related to IPOs in the first trading days, 
driving the prices up. After the deregulation one could assume the IPOs to be priced more 
reasonably by underwriters and thereby the fads and overoptimismn to weaken. 
Throughout the history, Chinese initial returns have also been bothered by poor long-term 
performance. High initial returns have usually indicated about worse long-term 
performance in global stock markets, and this is also documented in the latest studies 
from China. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to offer recent information and 
view of the development of these phenomena and their relationships during 2010–2012, 
right after the deregulation of pricing ceilings. This study focuses especially on the firm 
specific characteristics at the time of the issuance, if those are able to explain the long-
term performance.   
 
Research problem for this study is following: 
“Does the underpricing still exist in Chinese IPO markets? Does the anomaly of poor 
long-term performance exist among Chinese IPO markets after the deregulation of P/E 
ratio based IPO pricing, and can the poor long-term performance be explained with firm 
specific characteristics?” 
Hypotheses for this empirical research are followings;  
H1: “Initial public offerings have been statistically significantly underpriced in China 
during 2010-2012” 
H2: “Underpricing has weakened significantly during the research period” 
H3 “Chinese IPOs are poor long-term investments” 
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H4: “There is a statistically significant negative relationship between market-adjusted 
initial returns and long-term performance”  
H5: “There is a statistically significant relationship with pre-issue P/E value and long-
term performance” 
As a contribution, study offers a perspective to China’s domestic IPO markets, first by 
focusing on progression of the initial returns during 2010–2012, with this empirical 
research the study is able to present the development of initial returns and results will be 
comparable to previous studies, as the same methods will be used. Secondly it examines 
the relationship between firm specific characteristics and long-term performance, which 
pursues results from the key predictors of the long-term performance of IPOs.  
Limitations 
Study includes only the A-series IPOs which are exclusively for domestic Chinese 
investors. Study does not include the IPOs of state owned enterprises (SOE) or the 
seasonal equity offerings (SEO). The focus is purely on the initial public offerings of 
private companies.  
The sample consists 131 A-series IPOs from both, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The IPOs including to this study are unequally distributed between stock 
exchanges, as 111 IPOs were listed on Shenzhen stock exchange and 20 on Shanghai 
stock exchange. Additionally, the distribution of issues is unequal between research years. 
  
1.2. Structure of the study 
Introduction chapter conducts shortly the purpose of this empirical research. In the second 
chapter the principles of capital markets efficiency will be presented, from the view of 
stock valuation. Third chapter focuses on company’s valuation, first by presenting the 
most common stock valuation methods, and subsequently examining the IPO pricing 
mechanisms. Fourth chapter exhibits the theories of IPO underpricing as it approaches 
this subject by diving the theories into four main categories which are: asymmetric 
information, institutional theories, behavioral theories and theories based on ownership, 
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control and monitoring. Fifth chapter focuses on presenting the long-term performance 
anomaly in global markets. 
Since theoretical understanding is achieved, sixth chapter offers historical results from 
Chinese IPOs, by analyzing previous researches from IPO underpricing and long-term 
performance in China. This part focuses on the time period from 1987 to 2011. First, it 
examines the progression of initial returns. Secondly, examines the effects of the pricing 
mechanisms on the initial returns, and the development of those. Thirdly, sixth chapter 
summarizes the main factors which have caused underpricing among Chinese IPOs, while 
considering the difference between underpricing and markets’ overvaluation. The results 
of long-term performance of previous studies are also exhibited in this section. Seventh 
chapter focuses on the data and methodology of this study, as it also presents the used 
equations and formulas. The empirical results of this study are presented in the eighth 
chapter, with a consideration of conducting future research in China’s IPO markets. 
Chapter nine briefly concludes this empirical study and its key findings.   
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2. CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Capital market efficiency is generally defined with information, as in the markets are 
efficient when the prices of the securities quickly reflect all available and meaningful 
information. According to this theory, the prices of the securities should change only 
when new pertinent information occurs to the markets. All changes in the security prices 
ought to happen as “random walk”, and therefore markets cannot reliably predict the 
trajectories in security prices. The theory of the capital market efficiency maintains also 
an assumption which does not allow any available information to cause abnormal returns. 
All stakeholders in efficient capital markets will act rationally, in terms of pursuing 
maximal returns. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 80–82.) 
Capital market efficiency can be distinguished into three different categories depending 
on the forms of efficiency: weak-form, semi-weak-form and strong form. In the existence 
of weak-form markets, all available price information is reflected to the security prices, 
and the existence can be interpreted with technical analysis. (Fama 1970: 383.) If the 
terms of weak-form efficiency are fulfilled, all kinds of abnormal returns are impossible 
to achieve with historical security price information (Malkamäki & Martikainen 1990: 
35). In circumstances of semi-weak-form markets, all relevant public information 
regarding to the securities is quickly reflected to the prices, for example stock splits and 
announcements of quarter and annual earnings. Analyzing the semi-weak-form requires 
event studies and case-by-case data. On the highest form of efficiency – the strong form 
markets, the prices of the securities reflect all available information, even insider 
information. By analyzing the insider trading, the existence and strong-form efficiency 
conditions can be defined. (Fama 1970: 383.) There is a linear relationship among forms 
of efficiency. Therefore, markets have to accomplish the weak-forms before the markets 
can be considered fulfilling the semi-weak-forms of efficiency. In order to achieve the 
strong-form conditions, both of the lower conditions of efficiency needs to fulfilled too. 
(Malkamäki & Martikainen 1990: 35.) In theory, the capital market efficiency induces 
circumstances where abnormal returns are impossible to achieve (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 
84).  
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Fama (1970) examined the forms of efficiency, and the results strongly supported the 
weak-form assumption, although he notified that markets are not able to absorb all 
relevant available information immediately to the prices of securities. Empirical study 
and its results concerning on semi-weak-form supported the theory of capital market 
efficiency, especially denoting that the information related to company’s subsequent 
dividend payments and information about stock splits, were efficiently and on average 
completely absorbed to the price of a split share at the time of the split. As a conclusion, 
Fama remarks that markets which fulfill the strong-form efficiency should be seen as a 
benchmark.  
Lowry and Schwert (2004) examined the forms of efficiency in IPO pricing process. Their 
study covered all IPOs from AMEX, NMS and NYSE stock exchanges during 1985–
1999. Only IPOs with issuing price less than 5 $ were included to their sample. According 
to them there were two major findings related to underwriters. First, they remark that the 
preliminary price ranges of the IPOs set by underwriters, do not reflect all available 
information. Second, the final offer price of the issuing company similarly does not 
include all available public information, as underwriters disregarded part of them. 
Although as a conclusion they considered that the effects on the initial returns were 
insignificant and at large the underwriters’ incorporation of public information was not 
remarkably different from an efficient IPO pricing process.     
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3. VALUATION OF CORPORATION 
The value of the corporation bases on the value of its stocks. Therefore, the valuation of 
stocks is crucial in the IPO pricing process, and in understanding the underpricing. This 
chapter presents the most common models for defining the value of stocks, such as 
dividend valuation models, cash flow valuation model and capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). 
The fundamental (intrinsic) value of stocks (corporation) can be defined with cash flow 
model and dividend valuation model. The fundamental value for a corporation or its 
stocks can be defined by discounting all expected future cash flows or dividends to 
present and then summing them up. The purpose of the fundamental value is to describe 
the real value of the corporation or its stocks, and with this knowledge the initial returns 
can be distinguished to underpricing and overvaluation. (Kaen 1995: 949–951; Song, Tan 
& Yi 2014: 48.) 
 
3.1. Valuation of corporation – literature review 
Dividend valuation model 
The most common valuation model for stock bases on the cash flows the stock generates 
to its owner, in terms of dividends. The price of the stock is defined as the present value 
of its expected future per share cash dividends, and its future selling price. Investors 
define their personal required rate of return, and it reflects what the investor is able to 
earn from another corresponding investment with equal risk. The general assumption is 
that the higher the risk the higher the required rate of return. With previous notations the 
equation for dividend based can be presented as below. (Kaen 1995: 197–199.) 
(1) 𝑃0 =  ∑ [
𝐷𝑡
(1 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑡
]
𝑡=1
  
 
where P = the price of an individual common stock, the subscript on P denotes 
the time when the price is observed. Hence, 𝑃0 is today’s stock price 
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 D = cash dividends per stock, also subscripted for time 
𝑘𝑒 = investor’s required rate of return for the stock of corporation 
t = time  
 
With the above presented pattern, a sloppy price for a stock can be defined. However, the 
model is far from accurate since it pays attention only on three basic factors; time, cash 
dividends and the investor’s required rate of return. It has its pitfalls since all corporations 
do not pay cash dividends and defining enough of accurate rate of returns is not an easy 
task as there are plenty of other variables which effect on the value of the stock. As a 
difference to the bonds, stocks have no maturity, those remain outstanding from the 
moment of the IPO. Therefore, predictions with this model cannot be considered accurate. 
(Kaen 1995: 199.) 
In circumstances when the dividends of the corporation are expected to be equal in each 
year, the no-growth version can be applied for defining stock’s value. The valid equation 
for such scenarios is following. (Kaen 1995: 199–200.)   
(2) 𝑃0 =
𝐷1
𝑘𝑒
  
where: 𝑃0 = price of the stock 
 𝐷1 = equal annual dividends  
 𝑘𝑒 = investor’s required rate of return for the stock of corporation 
 
It is irrational to expect the cash dividends to be the same in the long run. The constant-
growth version for defining stock value based on per share cash dividends is called 
Gordon’s growth pattern. With a simple modification it offers more reliable prediction 
yet maintaining its simplicity, as it expects the annual growth rate to be the same in every 
year. The only transformation from the models presented above is the added 𝑔, which 
denotes the expected annual growth rate in percentages. (Kaen 1995: 200–202.)  
(3) 𝑃0 =  
𝐷1
𝑘𝑒 − 𝑔
  
where:  𝑃0 = price of the stock 
 𝐷1 = dividends 
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 𝑘𝑒 = investor’s required rate of return for the stock of corporation 
 𝑔 = annual growth rate of dividends 
 
The Gordon’s growth-pattern can be transformed to a wider version which pays attention 
to the annual growth rate in per stock cash dividends, stock price and earnings are defined 
with the percentage ratio of earnings that corporation retains, and the return that 
corporation could achieve on its investment. When the percentage ratio of retained 
earnings is equal to the return that corporation is able to earn from new investment, the 
growth rate for dividends can be defined as following, g = (b)(r), when b = percentage 
of earnings retained in the corporation, and r = return the corporation is able to earn on 
new equity investments. 𝐷1 can also be expanded to (𝐸1)(1-b), where 𝐸1 denotes the 
expected earnings per share (EPS). Since corporation is able to do two things with EPS; 
retain them in the corporation or pay them out as dividends. 𝐷1 can be expressed as the 
percentage of earnings retained, (1-b) which is called as dividend payout ratio. Therefore, 
the previous equation is formed to following. (Kaen 1995: 204–207.) 
(4) 𝑃0 =
𝐷1
𝑘𝑒
=  
𝐸1(1 − 𝑏)
𝑘𝑒 − 𝑏𝑟
  
where: 𝑃0 = price of the stock 
 𝐷1 = dividends 
 𝑘𝑒 = investor’s required rate of return for the stock of corporation 
 𝐸1 = expected earnings per share (EPS)  
 𝑏 = percentage of earnings retained in the corporation 
 r = return the corporation is able to earn on new equity investments 
 
 
Cash flow valuation 
The previously presented equation can be applied for calculating the net present value of 
corporation based on its cash flows. Principle remains the same in the model, as only the 
denoting figures will change. Corporations have various assets which generate cash flows 
and based on the future cash flows, the present value of asset can be defined by 
discounting the expected cash flows to present with the discount factor. (Brealey & Myers 
1984: 29–29.) 
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(5) 𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  𝐶0 + 𝑃𝑉 =  𝐶0 + ∑  
𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝑡
  
where: 𝑁𝑃𝑉 = the net present value of the asset 
 𝑃𝑉 = cash flows that asset creates, their present value 
 𝐶0 = accounts for all cash flows already generated by the asset at time 0 
 r = discount factor 
 t = time 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can be considered as a tool for investors to define 
the expected rate of return. The model derives the expected rate of return from market 
risk which is multiplied with corporation’s individual beta, taking into account the risk 
related to a specific corporation. Thus, the model gives an estimate of the expected rate 
of return, which can be used in various pricing and estimating equations. The risk related 
to stock markets is called beta, coefficient for the entire stock market is 1 and the 
coefficient for an individual corporation can be any positive figure above 0, depending 
on the risk related to the corporation. (Ross, Westerfield & Jordan 1998: 383–391.) 
(6) 𝛽𝑖 =  
𝜎𝑖𝑚
𝜎𝑚2
  
where: 𝛽𝑖 = beta of an investment 
 𝜎𝑖𝑚 = covariance between investment and market portfolio 
 𝜎𝑚
2  = covariance of return for market portfolio 
 
Beta describes the correlation between investment and market, if the coefficient is below 
1, it is called as defensive and maintains less risk than markets on average. If the 
coefficient is over 1, it is considered as aggressive and maintain more risk than markets 
on average. As an example, if beta is 1,1 and the markets surge by 10 percentages, the 
value of the investment surges 1,1 x 10 % = 11%. (Ross et al. 1998: 383–391.) 
Capital Asset Pricing Model includes various objects including risk-free rate of return, 
rate of return for market portfolio and previously mentioned beta coefficient, as an 
outcome it pursues expected rate of return for individual investment. General approach is 
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to describe the risk-free rate of return with the interest rates of state bonds, with equal 
maturity as the upcoming investment has. (Ross et al. 1998: 383–391.)  
(7) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  𝑅𝑓 +  𝑥 𝛽𝑖 [𝐸(𝑅𝑀) −  𝑅𝑓 ]  
where:  𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = expected rate of return for investment 
 𝑅𝑓 = risk-free rate of return 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑀) = rate of return for market portfolio 
 𝛽𝑖 = beta coefficient of an investment 
 
 
3.2. IPO pricing mechanisms 
There are various methods and ways to price and allocate initial public offerings. In this 
chapter the three most common pricing mechanisms will be presented, which are book-
building, fixed price and auction. Depending on the pricing mechanisms and 
circumstances, one may increase the underpricing as another may reduce it. Therefore, it 
is crucial to understand the principles of different mechanisms. The effects of the different 
pricing mechanisms in Chinese IPO markets are presented in chapter six. 
Book-building process 
Book-building model was developed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), as a solution for 
IPO pricing and allocation. In the book-building process the underwriters of certain IPOs 
pursue to gain information from their regular investors. Underwriters persuade investors 
to reveal their information of the markets or corporation during the pre-issue period, by 
allocating more stocks to these investors before allocating stocks to markets. In order the 
investors to be motivated to revel their information, they need to gain more profits by 
being truthful, compared to scenario when they reveal false information. 
Sherman & Titman (2002) criticize the book-building model since it includes investors 
to the bidding process, as they consider the general approach is to exclude them. In 
circumstances when the investors are included to the bidding process, the book-building 
process can be considered as a convenient way of rewarding and favoring good 
customers, since the IPOs are underpriced on average. According to them, in 
circumstances of costless information, the ideal participation rate of investors is infinite 
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and level of underpricing approaches zero. Inversely, if acquiring information is 
expensive, the desire for information defines the level of underpricing. However, there is 
a possibility for such situation in which expected level of underpricing is equal to the 
costs of acquiring information, creating indifference among investors if they should 
participate to the IPO. 
Derrien & Womack (2003) examined initial public offering pricing mechanisms in 
France. They found out differences between pricing processes since auction IPOs 
incorporated current market returns better to the offering price. Since underwriters 
controlled both; price of the IPO and access to vital institutional investors, corporations 
had no other choice than settle to the second-best underpricing outcome, if the applied 
process was book-building.     
Fixed price offering 
The principle of fixed price offering is simple, investors bid stocks with predefined offer 
price. When this model is applied, the price of the security will not reflect information 
from the markets. This breaks the first rule of capital market efficiency, the rule of weak-
form efficiency. 
According to Rock (1986) the underpricing of IPOs is inevitable in fixed price offerings. 
Without underpricing the underwriter is not able to compensate the uninformed investors 
as they face the winner’s curse and end up winning relatively poor stocks, while investors 
holding better information take advantage of their knowledge, and encapture all better 
performing IPOs.  
Ljungqvist, Jenkinson & Wilhelm (2003) examined the book-building and fixed price 
mechanisms with a data sample covering 2143 IPOs from 65 countries. According to 
them, book-building process was far more efficient as it produced less underpricing, 
compared to fixed-price offerings. As a downside, book-building process was more costly 
than fixed price offering.  
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Auction 
In circumstances of auction mechanism, investors bid stocks with quantity and price 
offers the day before the IPO is issued to the markets, as it is corresponding to the sealed-
bid auction. As a second step, market author calculates the expected demand for the stocks 
in the IPO after achieving knowledge about all bids. Once the expected demand is 
calculated, underwriter and issuer negotiate the price range in terms of offer and 
maximum price with the market author. In most scenarios the upcoming offer price of the 
IPO will be conciliated on a level what every selected investor will pay for the stock. All 
bids exceeding the maximum rule will be excluded, and in most cases the maximum level 
is chosen with a purpose to eliminate only unrealistic bids which are well over the clearing 
price. By applying this elimination method, they can prevent investors placing such high 
bids, which would guarantee the attainment of stocks. The main goal of this IPO 
allocation method is to achieve information about investors’ fair vision of the value of 
issuing company, therefore elimination of unrealistic bids is appropriate. Investors who 
bid stocks with a price range between maximum and offer price will obtain stocks based 
on pro rata basis. (Derrien & Womack 2003: 31–61.) In this context, pro rata basis means 
that the stocks will be allocated to investors according to the relation of their previous 
holdings.  
Derrien and Womack (2003) found out that in hot market conditions, the IPOs issued with 
auction method experienced significantly lower initial returns compared to corresponding 
book-built IPOs. According to them, the usage of auction method incorporates more 
information about market conditions to the price of the IPO. Consequently, the usage of 
auction guarantees a better efficiency for pricing, although it does not offer protection 
against overpricing, which is able to affect negatively on welfare.  
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4. UNDERPRICING THEORIES 
The underpricing of initial public offerings can be explained with several theories, and in 
most cases there is more than one reason for underpricing. Theories explaining this 
phenomenon can be divided into four main categories. Theories based on asymmetric 
information, behavioral theories, institutional theories and last theories based on 
ownership, control and monitoring. 
A wide scale empirical literature has documented significant underpricing among initial 
public offerings. According to previous literature and researches, the theories based on 
asymmetric information account for the best explanatory power, yet the rest of the 
theories remain their statistical significance. (Booth & Chua 1996: 292–293.)  
 
4.1. Theories based on asymmetric information 
As mentioned above, the asymmetrical information is the most common explanation in 
terms of explaining the initial public offering underpricing. Asymmetric information 
describes the unequally distributed knowledge and information about market conditions 
and companies between parties operating in the markets. In this context the most common 
parties are underwriter of the IPO, the issuing company and the investors at markets. In 
order to fulfill the assumption of unequally distributed information, one of these parties 
must possess more information from the issuing company, in terms of quality and 
potential or from the market conditions in terms of demand and supply. (Ritter & Welch 
2002: 1802–1804.) Further in this chapter winner’s curse, ex ante uncertainty, agent 
theory, signaling theory and underwriter reputation will be presented. 
Winner’s curse 
According to Rock (1986) the underpricing of IPOs is a consequence of unequal 
knowledge among investors. The investors operating on the market can be divided into 
two different group depending on the information they have. These groups shall be called 
as informed and uninformed investors. The informed investors have more information 
and knowledge of the issuing corporations and the fair value of their stocks, as the 
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uninformed investors do not possess that corresponding knowledge. Therefore, they have 
this window of opportunity to take advantage of the information they hold and bid only 
for mispriced securities, which are profitable for them. They will bid only for better 
quality stocks, and in hot market conditions when the overall demand is on high level, 
there is continuously growing population of uninformed investors bidding blindly and 
pursuing all IPO stocks. Due to the high demand, investors are not able to win these 
auctions, and it comes more obvious that uninformed investors will obtain lower-quality 
stocks. In practice, the “winner” who won the auction actually loses, since he obtained 
relatively bigger proportion of poor-quality stocks. According to Rock’s theory, the 
demand of informed investors is inadequate even to fulfill the supply of relatively 
profitably priced IPOs. Hence, markets cannot afford to lose the demand of uninformed 
investors and therefore all IPOs have to be sold to markets with some discount, in order 
to draw the attention among uninformed investors.      
Beatty & Ritter (1986) offered an expansion to above presented theory considering an ex 
ante hypothesis. The uninformed investors will submit bids for better quality IPOs after 
they have faced the winner’s curse problem, this leads into scenario where all initial 
public offerings need to be sold to markets with a discount, or full subscription will not 
be achieved. The difference between the degree of underpricing and conditional returns 
is directly related to the ex ante uncertainty, in terms of the real value of the issuing 
corporation. The winner’s curse problem intensifies due to the increasing uncertainty, 
which makes facing greater losses more probable. Therefore, uninformed investors are 
not willing to subscribe IPO stocks without greater level of underpricing.   
Keloharju (1993) investigated the winner’s curse hypothesis with data from Finnish IPO 
markets. Data sample covered only 80 IPOs between 1984–1989. According to his 
research the Finnish environment is ideal for testing this hypothesis since the probability 
of the existence of lawsuit-avoidance and litigation costs risk is insignificant, for example 
compared to U.S. IPO markets. His results were consistent with Rock’s theory, as the 
uninformed investors received mostly bigger proportions of IPOs with negative initial 
returns, and smaller proportion of IPOs with positive initial returns. Lewis (1990) tested 
Rock’s theory with data from British IPO markets, the sample covered 123 IPOs during 
1985–1988. According to his research the winner’s curse also existed in the British IPO 
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markets, as the results were consistent with the hypothesis and similar what Keloharju 
documented from Finland. The uninformed investors obtained larger proportion of poor-
quality stocks, in terms of weak initial returns, as the informed investors performed a lot 
better. Amihud, Hauser & Kirch (2003) examined the winner’s curse hypothesis with a 
data sample from Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Hypothesis received strong statistical 
support as on average the initial returns that uninformed investors obtained were negative 
and proportions from these IPOs were greater, due to the strong demand of uninformed 
investors. Participating in all initial public offerings offered a return of -1,18% or -1,77%, 
for 6 and 15 days holding periods after the IPO.                 
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory bases on assumption that the issuing corporation has more information 
of its quality and fair value than underwriter or investors. Underpricing is a form of 
signaling, the issuing corporation pursues to signal its quality and profitability to 
investors. They want to leave “a good taste into the investors mouths”, and encourage 
them to bid their stocks in the seasonal equity offerings. The issuing corporation faces the 
underpricing as a direct loss, however they will be compensated with greater capital gains 
in the future, when they issue more equity. Poor-quality corporations have no other choice 
than incurring imitation costs in order to seem equal to good-quality corporations. Despite 
their imitation efforts, the real value of the corporation may be revealed after the initial 
public offering, but before seasoned offering. Poor-quality corporations are forced to 
make a decision regarding to their appearance, either they will disclose their quality and 
accept that they are unable to achieve as good capital gains at the time of the initial public 
offering and seasonal offering as good quality corporations, or they pursue to appear as 
good-quality corporation and face the possible loss if they get revealed. Theory suggests 
that the poor-quality corporations should not be able to afford to face this immediate loss 
in form of underpricing, and only good-quality can afford to that. Therefore, this model 
can be interpreted as an explanation for the underpricing of initial public offerings, which 
is in equilibrium with the corporation’s quality. (Ibbotson 1975: 237–243; Welch 1989: 
421–449; Allen & Faulhaber 1989: 303–304.) 
Grinblatt & Hwang (1989) reformed previously presented signaling model to a two 
parameter signaling model. The model relies on the same basic assumption that the 
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issuing corporation has most knowledge and information of their future performance, in 
terms of cash flows. As they have the more information than outside investors, the 
management of the corporation still face the asymmetric information problem, and in 
order to overcome this obstacle they sell the IPO stocks to markets with a discount, and 
retain a proportion of the issued stocks in their personal portfolio. By these means the 
corporation is able to sign their good quality and their beliefs of profitable future to the 
potential investors. The results of the research asserted that the value of a given 
corporation has a positive relationship to the degree of underpricing which is positively 
related to the proportion of fractional holdings of issuer. With these results they were able 
to support their new found hypothesis and theory. They also reminded that corporations 
are able to signal their value with other means too, than by just retaining stocks or 
underpricing them. For example, high dividends are good way to signal their excellence, 
or by retaining high-priced auditors, investment bankers and advertising. After all they 
are giving money away.  
According to Allen & Faulhaber (1989) corporations have other ways to convince 
potential investors about their good-quality. They can emphasize their pre-IPO operating 
results, structure of the incentives for highest management, venture capitalists’ provision 
funds, quality of the board of directors as well as the quality of bank loans, in terms of 
interest rates.  
Ritter and Welch (2002) investigated the underpricing of IPOs with a data sample 
covering 6238 companies from U.S. stock markets, during 1980–2001. Their results 
showed the initial returns were on average 18,8% during the research period, although 
there was significant variation, as in between 1999 and 2000 the initial returns were on 
average 65 %. The research applied Fama-French multifactor model and according to the 
outcome of regression, they were unable to confirm that the asymmetric information 
would explain all of the high initial returns as they considered it was highly unlikely. 
Underwriters did not bundle several initial public offerings together, which would have 
lowered the average uncertainty among investors, as reducing the need for underpricing 
among information models. As a final conclusion they considered that in circumstances 
of significant underpricing, the behavioral explanations, allocation of stocks and agency 
conflicts are more likely to have a better explanatory power. 
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Alvarez and González (2005) tested the signaling theory hypothesis and long-term 
performance of Spanish IPOs, with a sample covering just 52 corporations from years 
1987–1997. The results they achieved were consistent with theories and previous 
researches (Grinblatt & Hwang 1989; Welch 1989; Allen & Faulhaber 1989), as the value 
of a corporation was positively related to the degree of underpricing which was positively 
related to the holdings of issuer. In Spain, main reason of corporations to sell stocks with 
discount in the IPOs seemed to be the drive to reach higher volumes and prices in the 
subsequent offerings, and without signaling their good quality, they were unable to 
perform as well.   
Agent Theory 
Baron’s (1982) theory of the IPO underpricing relies on assumption that the asymmetry 
of information is between investment banker and issuer. Due to the better knowledge of 
market conditions, firm valuation and IPOs compared to the issuing corporation, the 
corporation is willing to use the services of the investment banker, in terms of advising 
and distributing stocks. This causes a moral problem, since the pricing disorders are under 
the responsibility of the better informed investment banker. Will the investment banker 
pursue for optimal issue price, or aim for greater level of underpricing in order to ensure 
all stocks will be subscribed in the initial public offering, and simultaneously relieve his 
own work? The level of asymmetricity in the information between issuing corporation 
and investment banker has a positive relationship with the uncertainty of issuing 
corporation of its value. Consequently, this is directly reflected to the level of 
underpricing. 
Schenone (2004) examined the IPO underpricing with a sample of 1245 firms which were 
issued during 1998–2000. The research focused on asymmetric information between 
issuing corporation and underwriter, with two main objectives. In circumstances if the 
issuing corporation had an established relationship or banking relationship with the 
underwriter before the initial public offering, the information asymmetry between them 
should be significantly lower than without this pre-IPO relationship. As an argument for 
this, underwriter should know the company and its characteristics better since the 
company is already under monitoring. The results of this empirical study confirmed the 
existence of asymmetric information and its significance among IPO underpricing and 
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pre-IPO relationships. If the issuing firms had this relationship with prospective 
underwriter, the underpricing was on average 17 % smaller than in scenarios without this 
relationship. A banking relationship with underwriter caused the underpricing to be even 
on lower level. 
Underwriter reputation 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) considered an alternative suggestion for the reason of IPO 
underpricing, as an extension to the asymmetric information theories. The underwriter 
(investment bank) of an IPO and its reputation is a key determinant of underpricing. 
Underwriters enforce the underpricing equilibrium in order to protect their reputation. It 
is in the interests of investment bank to underprice the issue, even if they were able to 
define the real the price of the issue. If they will not underprice the issue, instead try to 
cheat investors by overpricing or not underpricing enough, their reputation suffers and 
they will lose potential customers. On the other hand, if they underprice the issue too 
much they will lose potential investors. This rationale bases on the winner’s curse 
problem and ex-ante uncertainty. Due to the fact the winner’s curse exists and 
underwriters cannot be sure at what price level the trading starts, they have to underprice 
the issue, as above mentioned, when the ex-ante uncertainty increases the winner’s curse 
intensifies. The other conditions for this assumption are that underwriters do not have 
non-salvageable reputation capital at stake, on which to earn returns and profits. Last 
condition is an extension of previous, if underwriter underprices the issues too much or 
too little, the ability of earning profits for this non-salvageable reputation capital 
substantially decreases. The results supported the assumption since the underwriters 
which priced IPOs off the line, lost relative market share in subsequent years, however 
the relation is not completely robust.   
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) examined the impacts of underwriter reputation on the 
initial returns of U.S. IPOs. The underwriters were divided into three groups: “bulge 
bracket”, “major bracket” and “submajor bracket”, depending on their previous records 
in terms of prestigiousness. Results are evident, the best underwriters marketed larger, 
less risky and more established IPOs, which on average produced less market-adjusted 
initial returns. Vice versa, the less prestigious underwriters underpriced IPOs with 
substantially greater level. 
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Figure 2.) Initial IPO returns. Market-adjusted initial returns of IPO companies divided into two categories 
based on the reputation of their underwriters, returns of 2292 IPOs issued in U.S. during 1979–1991. 
(Carter, Dark & Singh 1998: 300.)     
 
Carter and Manaster (1990) received supportive results of the underwriter reputation. 
When IPOs were listed by non-prestigious underwriter, those experienced higher initial 
returns, correspondingly the IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters produced lower 
initial returns with less variance. According to them, the price run-ups in terms of initial 
returns are hazardous for the issuing companies, therefore the low risk firms (low 
dispersion) pursue to reveal their low riskiness to the investors by using prestigious 
underwriters. Consequently, the prestigious underwriters will only handle low dispersion 
IPO companies in order to maintain their level of reputation. The empirical results of their 
study confirms the negative relation between underwriter reputation and price run-up 
variance of initial returns. In addition, they also found a significant negative relation 
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between the underwriter reputation and the level of underpricing. The regression analysis 
was conducted with 501 U.S. IPOs issued in 1979–1983. Besides the underwriter 
reputation, the shares sold at the IPO by officers & owners and the age of the company 
reached the 5 % statistical significance, when those were the only independent variable. 
However, in the complete model, the underwriter reputation was the only variable 
receiving statistical support, as an explanation for the market-adjusted initial returns. 
Despite the low explanatory power of the full model (𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2 = 0,15), the underwriter 
reputation accounts for the most (0,12), reflecting its significance in comparison to others.  
The results across studies confirm the underwriter reputation being an important factor in 
IPO underpricing, time after time the researches are consistent with the theory. Hence, it 
seems the underwriters as a matter of fact act rationally, pursuing the highest returns in 
the long run, instead of taking advantages of the window of opportunities. After careful 
consideration: the underwriter reputation itself will not cause underpricing, it is an 
explanation in the environment of asymmetric information which successfully combines 
the winner’s curse, ex-ante uncertainty and agent theory.  
    
4.2. Institutional theories 
Underpricing as a form of insurance 
Tinic (1988) presented a hypothesis for the IPO underpricing, which assumed that 
underpricing is a form of insurance against legal liability. Due to the Securities Act of 
1933, investors in the securities market are heavily protected. Disclosing false and 
misleading information is forbidden and if investors face such, they have rights to sue 
persons who have signed the registration statement, or were otherwise associated with the 
initial public offering. By leaving enough money on the table and keeping investors 
satisfied, or in other words, underpricing the IPO with enough of high level, the issuing 
firms can insurance them against legal liabilities. The costs of getting sued and achieved 
poor reputation would be more harmful for the corporation, in comparison to the excess 
proceeds it would gain from overpricing. Keloharju (1993) examined the IPO 
underpricing with Finnish IPO data. He found out that the IPOs were underpriced, but 
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since in the Finnish environment the possibility of getting sued is insignificant, there 
needs to be also other determinants for IPO underpricing. Hughes and Thakor (1992) 
reported corresponding results as Tinic, the legal environment played a key role among 
the underpricing of initial public offerings. However, they conclude that on average 
litigation risk should not inevitably affect underpricing, if they rational expectations are 
taken into account.     
Lowry and Shu (2002) examined the previously presented insurance and risk hypothesis 
with IPO data from U.S. stock markets. Their results showed that if corporation had a 
relatively high chance to get sued, the level of underpricing is greater. Data sample 
covered all IPOs during 1988–1995, and 4,6% of all those IPOs were either sued or under 
sue. The costs of getting sued, in terms of settlement costs, were on average 13,3 % of 
the proceeds raised from the offering. The results of the study were consistent with Tinic’s 
theory, since the underpricing of IPO could have been seen as an effective form against 
all settlement and litigation cost, as it lowered the possibility getting sued. Therefore, it 
also reduced plaintiffs’ potential recoverable damages.    
In circumstances of insuring the IPO against litigation costs by means of underpricing, 
corporations should be constantly under the threat of getting sued, and likewise, suing 
corporations should be relatively normal. Therefore, the environment is a crucial factor, 
as there are significant differences between different environments. The U.S. stock 
markets are probably one of the few ones where this can cause underpricing and receive 
significant forms, for example compared to European markets, where the possibility of 
facing legal action and litigation costs is insignificant, due to the comprehensive 
prospectus system.   
Price stabilization 
Hanley, Kumar & Seguin (1993) examined the price stabilization hypothesis with data 
from U.S. stock markets, covering 1523 Nasdaq IPOs. According to the Security 
Exchange Act 1940, price stabilization is the only acceptable form of market 
manipulation. In circumstances of price stabilization, the underwriter can prevent a drop 
in market prices by entering a syndicate bids, after the IPO is issued, which are usually 
done at the issue price. Their results approved the hypothesis, since the usage of price 
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stabilization squeezed the bid-ask spread significantly. This narrower bid-ask spread 
existed especially during first fifteen trading days when the trading price was close to the 
offer price. As another observation they noticed the prices of the IPO stocks declined 
approx. 2,5 % if the markets assumed the price support to be given, therefore the price 
stabilization affected concretely to the trading price. By underpricing the issues, the 
underwriter is able to equalize these adverse effects the price stabilization causes.  
Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) considered that by means of price stabilization, the issuing 
corporation and underwriter are able to keep uninformed investors satisfied, but only for 
a while. The price stabilization for the company will be given only for a short period, and 
the issuing company has to pay from this service, the IPO could have been just sold to the 
markets with greater discount. They concluded that underwriter should not apply the price 
stabilization, and thereby intervene the markets, since only the uninformed investors 
would be compensated. The greater level of underpricing would compensate both, 
informed and uninformed investors in a form of lower offer price, without intervening the 
normal market action. 
The price stabilization disturbs the normal market action since it prevents efficient stock 
price formation during first trading days. Being also in contradiction with capital market 
theory, the price stabilization clearly breaks the rules of semi-weak-forms of efficiency, 
since the price of the stock does not necessarily reflect all available information from the 
markets. However, considering this from another point of view, would the absence of 
price stabilization cause more adverse effects? The first trading days are crucial to the 
breakthrough of IPO, and without the price support the stocks of the corporation might 
face deep tailspin in terms of quotation, causing more problems to the corporation, as for 
example the previously mentioned costs of getting sued. Therefore, this short period of 
mispricing should be seen as inevitable. 
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4.3. Behavioral theories  
Behavioral theories explaining the underpricing of IPOs are mostly based on the behavior 
of individual investors. According to these theories the individual investors at the market 
will act irrationally. Hence, this chapter focuses on two of the most common behavioral 
theory explaining the IPO underpricing, the cascades and the investor sentiment.  
Cascades 
Welch (1992) introduced cascades hypothesis (i.e. fads hypothesis) as a potential reason 
for IPO underpricing. The hypothesis considers the subsequent individual investors will 
act irrationally after the issuance of IPO. They will not use the information they possess 
when they make investment decisions, and preferably by examining and relying on other 
investors’ bidding offers, they make their investment decisions. The existence of few 
early investors who consider the offering being overpriced, can basically doom the 
offering to fail since later investors base their decisions on the previous ones. 
Correspondingly, if these early investors see the offering being a bargain, they have the 
ability to create incredibly strong demand towards the initial public offering. From point 
of view of the issuing company, the subsequent scenario is more preferably, and therefore 
they are forced to price the IPO with some discount. By underpricing the issue, the 
underwriter and issuing company will win the early investors on their side and the 
cascades effect is complete.  
From point of view of the issuer, the existence of cascades effect is a benefit for company. 
In case the subsequent investors will not act rationally and they abandon their own 
information, relying on the earlier ones, these actions and bidding offers are no more 
informative to subsequent investors. Thereby the valuation of the corporation and its 
stocks will be inefficient, and will more likely create a preferable scenario for issuing 
corporation in terms of higher stock prices, as compared to scenario with higher and more 
accurate information flows among the investors. (Welch 1992: 696–697.) 
Amihud, Hauser and Kirch (2003) investigated the cascades hypothesis with a data 
sample covering 284 initial public offerings from Tel Aviv stock exchange. The results 
of the study supported the hypothesis, indicating that either the demand for IPO stocks 
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was extremely high or low. With these remarks they were able to capture the existence of 
significant herding behavior among IPO markets and investors. Depending on the 
strength of initial returns, investors seemed to abandon their own information and relied 
on others’.   
Pollock, Rindova &Maggitti (2008) examined if there was a relationship in terms of 
recent and available information from investors’ decisions, and what were the influences 
in terms of investors evaluation and allocation of stocks. The main objective of the study 
was to emphasize the media, and how it affected on investors’ evaluation and allocation. 
Their sample covered only 245 IPOs from U.S. stock markets, and according to the key 
findings, media played an important role affecting on the evaluation of investors. 
Especially the intracascade dynamics affected to the attention of investors, which can be 
interpreted as value for the corporation, and this view of the value is common for several 
investor groups. With these results the research proved the existence of cascades 
hypothesis. 
Investor sentiment 
Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) and Cornelli, Goldreich & Ljungqvist (2006) 
considered the investor sentiment accounts for the reacting and optimism of individual 
investors. Investors act irrationally, by being bullish (overoptimistic) and are willing to 
pay significantly more than the intrinsic value in cases when the sentiment is on high 
level. Correspondingly, when investors are bearish (pessimistic) they are not willing to 
pay enough from the stocks and thereby they will price themselves out of the markets. 
Investor sentiment defines also the systematic risk, the risk which cannot be diversified, 
and volatility is a generally approved meter of risk. Sentiment has a negative correlation 
with the volatility of markets, as in the growth of volatility makes investors more bearish 
and correspondingly, decrease of volatility makes them more bullish. (Lee, Jiang & Indro 
2002: 2295–2297.) The level of market sentiment can be interpreted with various ways 
however the most convenient way to define its level is by following volatility indices, for 
example VIX accounts for the implicit volatility of option prices of S&P 500 companies.   
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Derrien (2005) examined the influences of noise trading sentiment on IPO pricing with a 
data which covered 62 book-built IPOs from French stock markets. His model assumed 
that the information about company’s fundamental value and investor sentiment were the 
most important factors affecting on the aftermarket price of IPO stocks. Noise trader is 
an irrationally acting investor since he will not examine the fundamental value of the 
company before decision making, instead takes advantage of the bid-ask quotes and 
thereby makes the investment decisions. Research showed there is a strong positive 
correlation between the demand of individual investors and the market conditions, which 
strongly influenced on the prices of the initial public offerings. In circumstances of hot 
market conditions, the noise trader sentiment, and the bullish behavior generates 
significantly high initial returns.   
Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006) came up with a slightly different model considering 
the investor sentiment and distribution of stocks. According to their model the value of 
the issuing corporation is on the highest level, if the IPO stocks are allocated to 
underwriter’s regular co-operative institutional investors, before the gradual sale. By 
storing stocks to institutional investors’ portfolios, the underwriter is able to reduce the 
supply of IPO stocks by restricting the availability. The gradual sale will be completed in 
hot market conditions, by taking advantage of high sentiment and strong demand. The 
underpricing is required in order to maintain relationships with institutional investors by 
compensating them, since there is always a possibility of arising losses in case the demand 
and sentiment ceases. At the time of the gradual sale, when institutional investors release 
their holdings, the stock price returns close to its fundamental value. Of course in order 
to apply this model the stock manipulation by restricting the supply cannot be forbidden, 
and there must be enough of high sentiment in the markets. Thereby they conclude that 
the model is not relevant in most scenarios since it is not consistent with institutional 
reality.  
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4.4. Theories based on ownership, control and monitoring 
Brennan and Franks (1997) approached the IPO underpricing with ownership point of 
view, as the owners of the IPO company have strong desire to maintain their power in 
terms of decision making. They are willing to avoid the possibility of getting under hostile 
takeovers, and by these means they pursue well distributed ownership structure among 
new shareholders. The wide dispersion will be achieved by underpricing the IPO with 
significant level, which would create strong and excess demand and since the stocks will 
be allocated with pro rata basis, the excess demand would guarantee relatively small 
proportions of shares to new shareholders. Thereby, the owners are able to remain the 
dominant decision making power, since the IPO would bring only more owners with 
small fractional holdings who are not able to conduct takeover and control the 
management of the corporation.     
Booth and Chua (1996) reconstructed a model for explaining the IPO underpricing, one 
of its main assumptions is that significant level of underpricing is required and there are 
two advantages related to it. Underpricing the IPO leads to circumstances where the 
ownership is relatively broad, and it guarantees the good liquidity for the stocks of the 
issuing company. Large quantity of shareholders guarantees that there will be enough of 
information and constant on-going valuation, and as a benefit the market liquidity will be 
on higher level. Broad dispersion of ownership, good liquidity and amount of information 
of the company will affect positively on the equilibrium price of the stock in secondary 
markets.  
Field and Sheehan (2004) argue about the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
control-maintaining. Their research sample contained 953 U.S. IPOs issued between 
1988–1992, as the research focused on the effects of blockholders to the underpricing. 
Accurately, they observed the presence of blockholders, the fraction of the firm sold at 
the IPO, the presence of outside blockholders before IPO, the presence of venture 
capitalists before the IPO and the size of the firms. According to the results there was not 
any significant relationship between underpricing and outside blockholdings, since the 
underpricing had only an insignificant effect on those. 83 % of the companies involved 
to their research, had an outside blockholder before the time of the initial public offering. 
These results are strongly contradictory with the theory presented by Brennan and Franks. 
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Stoughton & Zechner (1998) created a model which pursues to focus on the effects of the 
ownership structure on the value of company. According to the model the relatively larger 
proportion of stocks should rather be allocated to the institutional investors. As a benefit 
for all shareholders, the large investors have greater ability to control and monitor the 
management of corporation. With improved accuracy in monitoring and controlling the 
uncertainty of presence and future will be significantly reduced, therefore it is inevitable 
to persuade blockholders in the IPO by means of underpricing, and eventually allocate 
greater proportions of shares for them. Favoring of blockholders increases the 
fundamental value of corporation due to the increased monitoring and decreased 
uncertainty, which more than offsets the lost equity that required underpricing caused. 
This model can be applied only in circumstances of book-building process, since the 
rationing and allocating of stocks cannot be completed through competitive allocating 
process, such as an auction.       
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5. LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS 
The price performance of IPO stocks has been under large focus of literature and 
empirical researches. The long-term performance of IPOs is commonly measured with 
two different factors, over 6, 12, 24 and 36 months: (a) wealth relatives, which compares 
the performance of IPO stocks to similar companies on the markets by size and industry, 
or to an alternative benchmark, and with (b) market-adjusted buy-and-hold period returns. 
Another common attribute of IPOs is their weak long-term performance, an anomaly 
which exists in every market. (Ritter & Welch 2002: 1795–1822.) 
There are two mainstream theories pursuing an explanation for the weak long-term 
performance of IPOs. The first one by Ritter (1991) assumes that in general equity and 
especially IPO markets are subjected to fads which highly affect the market prices. Fads, 
overoptimismn and speculation regarding to young growth companies result high initial 
returns, driving the trading prices up as individual investors in the market have relatively 
similar expectations from the company and its value. Over the time when the investors in 
the markets realize the real value of an IPO company, the interpretation of the company’s 
value converts downwards causing the stock price to fall, as the fads and speculation of 
highly profitable future opportunities weaken. According to Schultz (2003) the weak 
long-term performance can be explained with pseudo market timing, since most of the 
companies tend to issue their IPOs during hot markets, i.e. when the general economy 
raises and trading volumes are on higher level. Hence, companies can receive the highest 
price for their stocks in these conditions. As a result of this issuing habit, the general level 
of IPO stock prices is on higher level. The IPO companies might not be aware that the 
prices are at peak during the issuance, and if prices keep on surging, there will be more 
and more companies issuing their IPOs until prices starts to plunge and the number of 
offerings will decrease substantially. Common for both theories, there is a link between 
short-run overvaluation and poor long-term performance, and the weak long-term 
performance is partially explained with the moderation of the overvalued trading price, 
however from different point of views, while not excluding each other.  
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Table 1. Worldwide results of the IPO underpricing and long-term 
underperformance. 
Country Paper 
Sample 
period Initial returns (%) 
Long-term 
performance (%) 
U.S. Ritter (1987) 1977-82 14.8 - 
  Ibbotson et al. (1994) 1960-92 15.3 - 
  Ritter (1991) 1975-84 14.3 -29.1 
  Loughran (1993) 1967-87 - -33.3 
  Loughran & Ritter (1995) 1970-90 - -30.0 
  Brav et al. (2000) 1975-92 - -31.1 
Great 
Britain Jenkinson & Mayer (1988) 1983-86 10.7 - 
  Levis (1993) 1980-88 14.3 -8.1 
France Jacquillat (1986) 1972-86 4.8 - 
Germany Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-93 9.2 -12.1 
Japan Pettway & Kaneko (1996) 1989-93 46.2 - 
  Cai & Wei (1997) 1971-90 - -27.0 
Sweden Rydqvist (1993) 1970-91 39.0 - 
  Loughran et al. (1994) 1980-90 38.2 1.2 
Swizerland Kunz & Aggarwal (1994) 1983-89 35.8 -6.1 
Australia Lee et al. (1996) 1976-89 11.9 -51.0 
Brazil Arrarwal et al. (1993) 1979-90 78.5 -47.0 
Chile Arrarwal et al. (1993) 1982-90 16.3 -23.7 
Korea Dhatt et al. (1993) 1980-90 78.1 - 
  Kim et al. (1995) 1985-88 - 91.6 
Hong Kong Chen et al. (2001) 1993-96 19.0 - 
  McGuinness (1993) 1980-90 - -18.3 
Sinagapore Koh & Walter (1989) 1973-87 27.0 - 
  Hin & Mahmood (1993) 1976-84 - -9.2 
Table above comprises the main studies on IPO underpricing and long-term performance. Long-term 
performance is the buy-and-hold period return, depending on the study, from 2 to 6 years while initial 
returns are excluded. The computation methods vary depending on the study as well. (Àlvarez & 
González 2005: 327.) 
Keloharju (1990) researched 91 Finnish IPOs issued during 1984–1989. The results were 
consistent with the assumption of weak long-term performance as the cumulative market-
adjusted returns for 6, 12, 24 and 36 months were negative, being -3,2 %, -9,8 %, -22,9 
% and -26,4 %, as the subsequent three of them were also statistically significant at 5 % 
level. The mean wealth relative compared to value-weighted index was 0,789, when the 
initial returns were excluded, reflecting the clear underperformance in comparison to 
general performance of index. By analyzing four different industries and issuing years, 
38 
 
Keloharju considered there were no major differences between neither the industries nor 
the issuing years. However, the negative abnormal long-term performance is more serious 
among small companies. His final suggestion for the weak long-term returns was 
consistent with Schultz’s assumption, as the Finnish IPO markets were exceptionally 
active during the research period, the overoptimistic investors may have got disappointed 
as they became more aware of the characteristics of IPOs, resulting in the negative 
cumulative returns during longer period.  
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) discovered the weak long-term performance with a sample 
of 1435 IPOs issued in U.S. during 1977–1987. Research examined the performance of 
IPOs only over one year (~250 trading days), and reported the mean market-adjusted 
(against NASDAQ) one-year holding period return was -13,73 %, as the median was -
20,39 %. The research was conducted during hot markets, and IPOs generated abnormal 
positive returns in shorter investment period, however them turning to negative five 
months after the issuance. The cross-sectional analysis of 250 trading days indicated the 
weak long-term performance is more serious problem among smaller companies, yet 
being not completely robust.  The overoptimismn and fads in the market received strong 
support as a reason for the long-term underperformance.  
Ritter (1991) documented the behavior of weak long-term performance of 1526 U.S. 
IPOs, which were issued during 1975–1984. The research compared the three-year raw 
returns of IPO companies to the returns of matching firms by size and by industry. In 
comparison the underperformance was highly significant, the average three-year holding 
period return was 34,47 % for IPO companies, as it was 61,86 % for the matching firms. 
Results captured also a dependency of the size of the issuance and the average adjusted 
initial returns between the three-year holding period returns. Small IPOs tended to have 
higher initial returns, as in the lowest quintile the average adjusted initial returns were 
27,45 % and the three-year holding period returns were 17,94 %, while the initial returns 
were excluded. Corresponding ratios for the highest quintile were 9,96 % and 39,81 %. 
Results reflect the significance of the size of the issuance, as also the possibility of fads 
and overoptimismn relating to small IPOs. Especially among small IPOs, higher initial 
returns were a sign of worse long-term performance, as the results were not that robust 
with larger IPOs. The age of the company had a strong explanatory power as well, the 
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most recently founded companies had the highest initial returns (29,42 %), and weakest 
three-year holding period returns (5,34 %), reflecting the overoptimismn related to young 
“high potential companies”. Correspondingly, the oldest companies generated 
significantly lower initial returns (5,42 %), yet their three-year holding period returns 
were the highest (91,81 %). Ritter considered the ultimate explanation for weak long-term 
performance is the overoptimismn in the markets, which is taken advantage by the issuing 
companies, as those tended to go public at the time of market peak. 
Ljungqvist (1997) examined the long-term underpricing phenomenon in German, with a 
sample comprising 189 IPOs issued during 1970–1993. During the research period, 
German IPOs were profitable till one year, if held for three years the investors lost on 
average 12,1 % compared to the market index. However, there were significant inside 
sample differences, as the average three-year holding period return in comparison to 
market index was -27,2 % during 1988–1990, and only -1,8 % during 1970–1987. Results 
strongly supported the presence of weak long-term performance of IPOs, however raising 
a question of the dependency of general market conditions, since the differences were 
enormous.   
Loughran and Ritter (1995) focused on the long-term performance of U.S. IPOs issued 
between 1970 and 1990. The sample consisted of 4753 issues, and they measured the 3- 
& 5-year buy-and-hold period returns as well as their wealth relatives. IPOs 
underperformed the matching firms with a great magnitude, 3-year buy-and-hold returns 
were only 8,4 % for IPOs while the initial returns were excluded, as the corresponding 
ratio for matching firms was 35,3 %, resulting in the wealth relative of 0,80. Comparable 
ratios for 5-year buy-and-hold returns were 15,7 % and 66,4 %, as the wealth relative for 
the cohort was 0,7. These results indicated a strong presence of weak long-term 
performance of IPOs, which strengthened over the time. Weak long-term performance 
seemed to be a result of IPO misvaluation, since investors were bullishly subscribing IPOs 
in order to find big winners of future. Consequently, the systematic misvaluation of IPOs 
conducts to worse performance on longer period, as the investors find out their 
expectations are over-scaled when the returns of companies will not grow as expected. 
Therefore, the U.S. IPO markets during 1970–1990 cannot be considered efficient, since 
the prices of IPO stocks will not reflect the real values of stocks, instead reflecting the 
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expanded expectations and speculation. However, in the subsequent years of sample, the 
phenomenon got weaker since the long-term performance of IPOs increased substantially, 
affecting also positive wealth relatives for IPOs, simultaneously indicating about the 
improved efficiency in the markets. 
Alvarez and González (2005) studied Spanish IPOs issued in 1987–1997, with a sample 
of 112 companies. The used methodology computed the 1-, 3- and 5-year buy-and-hold 
period returns. Furthermore, they calculated the abnormal holding period returns for each 
period by comparing several different alternative benchmarks; including value-weighted 
market index, size portfolio, B/M ratio portfolio, B/M & size portfolio and control firms. 
Wealth relatives for one-year holding period returns exceeded 1 in every class, as the 
abnormal returns for almost every class were positive, however any of the classes reached 
the statistical significance of 5 %. Statistically the most notable results appeared in the 3-
year holding period returns, as two classes exceed the 5 % significance level: B/M ratio 
portfolio and size portfolio. The abnormal returns were substantially negative in every 
class, ranging from -18,59 % to -32,16 %. Findings from the 5-year sample suggested 
that on average the weak long-term performance exists especially between 1 and 5 years 
after issuance, since the abnormal returns were still mostly negative, though starting to 
turn positive and the variance between classes increased. Any of the classes no more 
reached the 5 % significance level. Research confirmed the positive relationship between 
the level of underpricing and long-term performance, in other words, the higher the initial 
returns were, the better the long-term performance, being in line with the signaling 
hypothesis. With a logistic regression analysis, they assessed the importance of different 
variables for the buy-and-hold period returns. The companies’ amounts of assets one year 
before the issue was insignificant in every holding period, as well as the returns for assets 
one year before the IPO. Neither the size of the offering received any statistical support 
of being important variable in terms of buy-and-hold period returns. 
Cai and Wei (1997) accomplished a research concerning on the long-term performance 
of Japanese IPOs, research was conducted with 180 IPOs issued in 1971–1992. They 
performed the comparison against 8 different portfolios, resulting in wealth relatives of 
less than one every time, as the wealth relatives decreased over the time too. Worth 
noticing, despite the poor performance compared to benchmarks, IPOs in Japan 
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performed rather well in general. Raw buy-and-hold period returns for 1, 3 and 5 years 
were on average 14,8 %, 34,2 % and 62,1 %. IPOs issued in subsequent years in the 
sample performed worse than the rest, especially during 1988–1992. As an alternative 
suggestion, the Japanese asset price bubble which lasted from 1986 to 1991, might have 
substantially affected to the IPOs through investors’ trust to economy. Even though by 
using different portfolios we are able to conduct the comparable performance of IPOs, 
the method will not account for the investors’ beliefs, as the IPOs can generally be 
considered containing more risk compared to the existing benchmark companies. The 
number of issued IPOs was significantly lower compared to previous years, which 
supports the assumption of bias in the results, and market conditions’ explanatory power. 
When descriptive statistics were controlled by size, gross proceeds and M/B ratios, 
smallest companies had significantly higher holding period returns compared to large 
ones, measured over 5 years the difference was five times greater. When IPOs were 
categorized by gross proceeds, over the same time, the results showed the biggest 
issuances outperformed the smaller ones by 2,5 times. Low M/B ratio indicated better 
long-term performance than high ratio, difference being approximately twice. Across 
these results there seems to be highly negative correlation between initial returns and 
holding period returns. In every category, the companies which had the highest initial 
returns had also the worst long-term performance. However, since there is no actual 
statistical analysis about the significance and consistency of these figures, the statistical 
dependency of these variables cannot be robustly determined.   
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) researched the reason for the significant long-term 
underperform of industrial Australian IPOs compared to the market movements. Data 
sample covered a total of 266 IPOs issued between years 1976–1989. An equally 
weighted investment in IPO shares for 3 years offered an average cumulative return of -
51,26 %. According to the results of the cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis 
for the 1-, 2- and 3-year market-index-adjusted holding period returns, the level of 
underpricing (initial returns) was the only which had any statistical explanatory power at 
5 % significance level. However, all of the independent variables (underpricing, issue 
size, time to listing & retained ownership) failed to explain the 3-year holding period 
returns. Hence, the relationship between long-term performance and initial returns can be 
considered as positive and curvilinear, as it subsided over the time. 
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Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) investigated the underwriter reputation and its impact on 
the long-term performance of IPOs. They presumed the better the reputation of the 
underwriter, the better the long-term performance, with a rationale that the higher quality 
underwriters attempt to market IPOs which will perform better in the long run, in 
comparison to other IPOs. Hence, by marketing IPOs with relatively better long-term 
performance, the underwriters are able to maintain their high reputation. The study was 
completed with 2292 U.S. IPOs issued between 1979 and 1991. With a cross-sectional 
regression model, they achieved results supporting the assumption, as the IPOs 
underwritten by more prestigious underwriters experienced on average less negative 
market-adjusted long-term performance when measured over three years. However, the 
results were not comprehensively robust. The underwriter reputation was divided into 
three different categories: high, medium and low. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
all pairwise differences were significant at 1 % level, and when measured with more 
accurate Student’s t-test, the difference in means for medium and high groups was 
significant at 5 % level. The difference between high and low groups was significant only 
at 10 %, in addition the difference between low and medium was insignificant. Thereby, 
these results can be seen as an indicator of the importance of underwriter reputation. 
Although the more accurate measures revealed contradictions in the results.   
The long-term performance of IPOs and the most important variables explaining the 
phenomena greatly depends on the markets, market conditions and time period. Unique 
market specific characteristics are able to explain a part of the weak long-term 
performance, as in Australia the relatively strict regulation of IPOs compared to U.S. 
markets. The general weak long-term performance of IPOs is common for every market, 
as the magnitude of it depends mostly on the market conditions and investor sentiment. 
Empirical literature has also started to approach the phenomenon from another angle, if 
firm specific characteristics are able to predict the post-issue performance of IPOs. 
Common for most of the results is that the smallest companies have the worst long-term 
performance and vice versa. Furthermore, there seems to be a relationship between the 
initial returns and long-term performance, as high initial returns predict poor long-term 
performance in every research, except in one (Alvarez & González 2005). On the other 
hand, these can be considered as proxies for the individual investors’ high expectations 
and inefficient pricing of markets. Worth noticing, when analyzing the firm specific 
43 
 
characteristics, the explanatory power of regression model is substantially weaker than in 
regressions which pay more attention to market conditions and investor sentiment. 
Logically, the explanatory power of the models also steadily decreases over the time, 
resulting in significantly weaker prediction accuracy.   
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6. IPO UNDERPRICING –  HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FROM 
CHINA 
This chapter presents historical evidence from the underpricing of Chinese IPOs, as well 
as from the long-term performance of those. At first, the trajectory of initial returns during 
1987–2011 will be presented by referring the previous studies. Secondly, the chapter 
focuses on the pricing mechanisms, their reforms and on the effects they caused to the 
IPO underpricing. As a third step, the most important determinants of underpricing are 
presented, and last, the results of the long-term performance of IPOs according to 
previous researches are under examination.       
6.1. The progression of initial returns over the time 
Several researches in finance have proven that the IPOs of common stocks are 
systematically and significantly underpriced to their subsequent trading price, and the 
underpricing of IPOs in China has drawn much attention (Yu & Tse 2006: 363). This 
section presents chronologically the trajectory of initial returns according to the previous 
studies.  
 
Figure 3.) Average initial returns of A-series IPOs in China. Sorted by research years, between brackets 
the research sample size. Every research will be presented below. 
Su and Fleisher were one of the firsts who examined the underpricing of Chinese IPOs, 
their data covers IPOs issued during 1987–1995. Since the exchanges of Shanghai and 
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Shenzhen were established in 1990 and in 1991, the research also covered data from the 
time before market reform. The research sample consisted 308 domestic A-series IPOs, 
and on average the initial returns were massive 948,59 %, the extremities were 
extraordinary high, as the highest individual initial return was 38300 %, and the weakest 
just -18,58 %. (Su & Fleisher 1999: 173–176, 182.) These initial returns are unbelievably 
high, and the highest ones in the world. As a reminder, during the early stages of China’s 
stock markets, investors had this opportunity to invest in stocks for the first time, and the 
supply of shares was moderate. Therefore, the imbalance between supply and demand, 
investor sentiment and bullish behavior may have been key factors explaining these sky-
high initial returns. Mok & Hui researched the underpricing of Chinese IPOs with data 
from 1990–1993. During that period the initial returns were on average 362,3%, however 
the study accounted only for IPOs issued in Shanghai stock exchange, and the sample 
size was rather small, maintaining only 87 IPOs. (Mok & Hui 1998: 458,464.) There is 
already a huge difference between the results of these researches, since the level of initial 
returns has decreased almost three times. The results are not totally comparable due to 
the differences in samples sizes, research periods and markets, as the study from Su & 
Fleisher covered both exchanges and time period before the market reform, whereas Mok 
& Hui researched only IPOs issued in Shanghai. 
Guo, Brooks and Fung (2011) completed a research which covered A-series IPOs issued 
in both exchanges, with an extensive sample covering 1660 IPOs during 1991–2009. The 
data of their study were well distributed as the quantity of IPOs issued every year was 
almost equal, results showed that on average the initial returns were only 84 %. Due to 
the long research period, the average initial returns are not able to explain the real path of 
progression and inside sample differences must be huge in order to be consistent with 
earlier studies. Chen, Firth and Kim (2000) investigated all IPOs issued to both exchanges 
which had relevant and available data, thereby the sample maintained 277 IPOs issued 
during 1992–1995. On average the initial returns of this sample were 350,47 %, indicating 
also about the consistency with results that Mok & Hui reported and confirmed that the 
level of initial returns did not decrease during 1990–1995. In their further research, Chen, 
Firth & Kim (2004) expanded the sample size to cover 701 IPOs, as the research period 
was 1992–1995 this time. Achieved results were rather similar, as on average the initial 
returns were 298 %, without any significant difference between the stock exchanges. 
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According to the documentation the weakest initial return during their period was only -
18 %, as the highest was 3544 %. Tian (2011) examined the initial returns of Chinese 
IPOs, covering 1377 issued IPOs during 1992–2004. On average the initial returns were 
247 %, as the sample accounted for both, Shanghai & Shenzhen exchanges.   
With these results it is obvious that the trajectory of initial returns is heading downwards. 
The previously presented results from Tian and Guo, Brooks & Fung are based on almost 
equal sample sizes, and the difference between research periods is not meaningfully 
significant. Therefore, it is possible that Guo, Brooks & Fung have reported median 
figures instead of mean, or there are some major differences in the initial returns in the 
ends of research periods, which explain the contradiction between the results.     
Chan, Wang & Wei (2004) investigated the initial returns during 1993–1998 with a 
sample of 570 IPOs. Results were consistent with assumption of weakening initial returns, 
as they reported that the initial returns were on average 178 %. Su (2004) examined 348 
IPOs issued during 1994–1999, and the average initial returns were 124,2 %. In this 6-
year research period, there were significant inside sample differences, as the initial returns 
were on average 314,5 % in 1994, 93,9 % in 1996, and during the last research year, 56,4 
%. Such a rapid decrease of initial returns requires some serious explanations, for example 
changes in macroeconomic environment. Perhaps the 1997 started Asian finance crisis 
could account for a part of the change, or changes in regulatory environment.   
Yu and Tse (2006) found out the average initial returns were 123,59 %, with a sample of 
343 IPOs during 1995–1998. With these results we are able to confirm that initial returns 
had weakened. Chi & Padgett (2005) reported equal results as Yu & Tse achieved, on 
average the initial returns were 129,16 %. However, their sample was significantly larger, 
as it maintained 668 issued IPOs during 1996–2000.  
According to Cheung, Ouyand & Tan (2009) one possible explanation for the decrease 
of initial returns is changes in China’s regulatory environment. China had exercised two 
new laws, the Company Law in 1994 and the Securities Law in 1999. Before the 
Company Law, there were no standardized regulation related to disclosure mechanisms 
of information, and this new law clarified the regulations around the issuance and transfer 
of stocks. The Securities Law stated that companies which exceeded the listing terms 
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satisfyingly, were released from going through the regulatory examination process and 
were able to issue their stocks after the verification. The presented changes in regulatory 
environment must have influenced to the initial returns with decreasing means, as it is 
obvious the increased disclosure of information and thereby improved market efficiency, 
have reduced the asymmetry of information between IPO companies and investors.    
Gao (2010) completed a research with 217 IPOs, and he found out that the average first 
day returns of IPO stocks were 157 % in China, during 2006–2008. Song, Tan & Yi 
(2014) researched the underpricing of IPOs in China, with a data sample covering 948 
issued companies during 2006–2011. The results showed that the level on initial returns 
had decreased outstandingly, and on average those were just 66 %.  
The results that Song, Tan & Yi and Gao provided, confirmed that the trajectory of initial 
returns has fluctuated, with significant means. A part of this variation in initial returns 
can maybe be explained with global financial crisis which started in 2008, and the strong 
upswing in world’s economy before that. However, there is no researches available from 
IPO underpricing and initial returns of Chinese IPOs during 2001–2005. Thereby, this 
study cannot comprehensively identify and analyze the progression and circumstances of 
initial returns. In order this study to be completely accurate, Guo & Brooks (2008) 
examined the initial returns of Chinese IPOs with a sample of 286 initial public offerings, 
issued exactly during those years. However, they reported only the market-adjusted initial 
returns, which were 93,49 %. These figures fit well in the decrease of initial returns, 
though the ratios are not fully comparable, but market-adjusted initial return is rather good 
indicator in most circumstances, depending on the listing gap. The difference between 
raw- and market-adjusted initial returns will be presented in chapter 7.   
Despite the strong decrease of initial returns during the examination period, those have 
been statistically on extremely significant level, as those have also been the highest ones 
in the world. For comparison, Koop and Li (2001) investigated the underpricing of IPOs 
in U.S. stock markets, with a huge sample covering 2969 IPOs issued between 1985–
1998. Their results represent the enormous difference between these two economic 
environments, since the average initial returns were only 11,06 % among IPOs issued in 
U.S stock markets.        
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6.2. Pricing mechanisms in China 
During the development of Chinese stock markets, the pricing mechanisms of initial 
public offerings have varied. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is 
the authority which has always determined the applied pricing mechanisms. (Cheung, 
Ouyang & Tan 2009: 695.) 
During the early phases of China’s stock market development, the CSRC ruled that the 
offer prices of IPOs needed to be determined by applying a given formula. The formula 
accounted the average of company’s past three years’ earnings, and the based on those 
the P/E ratio of the IPO stocks of issuing company should range from 13 to 15, as 15 was 
the ultimate maximum. The purpose of this calculation method was to avoid scenarios 
where bullish investment bankers project bullish earning, therefore this could have been 
seen as protecting investors. The price for the IPO stock given by this formula differs 
significantly from the overall valuation of stocks on the markets, for example in 1998 the 
average P/E ratio for stocks on the markets was closer to 50. This difference between pre-
set IPO P/E ratio and overall market P/E ratio is enormous, obviously strengthening the 
demand of IPO stocks since the price increase will assuredly contract the difference 
between markets and IPO stocks once those are issued. (Cheung, Ouyang & Tan 2009: 
695; Chi & Padgett 2005: 74.) According to Gao this can be considered as fixed price, 
since the offer price of issuing company is systematically determined, the IPOs will be 
systematically underpriced as well. Speculation around IPO stocks prevents the pure 
market pricing in these circumstances. (Gao 2010: 79.) 
Systematical underpricing and strong demand among IPOs support each other, 
influencing even higher initial returns and raising the overvaluation of IPO stocks. When 
issuing companies are forced to determine their offer price by applying a specific formula, 
the underpricing of IPO stocks cannot be explained with all theories, since some of them 
become insignificant. For instance, issuing corporation is not able to signal their good 
quality with a low IPO price, since they are not even able to decide their offer price in the 
IPO. Even if there would be asymmetric information between the issuing corporation and 
investors, the hypothesis is irrelevant.  
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The book-building method was applied to general usage among domestic initial public 
offerings by CSRC in July 1999. The issuing company was able to take advantage of this 
method if they fulfilled the requirement of total capital equity, which needed to exceed 
400 million RMB, if the issuing company had less equity, they were forced to use the old 
P/E based pricing formula. In the early stages after adopting the usage of book-building 
model, there were some seriously overheated IPOs, which had extremely high P/E ratios. 
Main reason for this was the inability of retail and institutional investors to determine 
offer prices.  (Cheung, Ouyang & Tan 2009: 696.)  
The CSRC adopted the complete usage book-building model for all initial public 
offerings in 2005, and started to revoke the restrictions. Eventually, CSRC deregulated 
all IPO pricing regulations in June 2009, and price formation became floating. Chinese 
IPO markets have seemed to become more market oriented after the book-building 
method was finally adopted, despite the fact that current book-building model cannot be 
considered completely driven by markets. (Gao 2010: 79; Yu & Tse 2006: 381; Song et 
al. 2014: 40.) 
As another regulatory implementation, new set of Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) 
were established in 2007, executing the new rules became mandatory for all listed 
corporations. Being almost identical with IFRS, the new CAS was a whole lot different 
compared to previous accounting standards. After the adoption of new CAS, corporations 
were able to incorporate underdeveloped assets to balance sheet, creating another 
problem. Managers of the corporation had now an incentive to overstate these assets to 
balance sheet, which would have otherwise been booked as depreciations. China used to 
have extremely conservative accounting standards and by executing those standards, the 
financial statement presented the fair values of assets better. Initialization of the new CAS 
might have affected negatively to the quality of accounting information, as it led to less 
conservative accounting. (Lin & Tian 2012: 128.)  
According to Chan, Wang & Wei (2004), one of the major factors causing underpricing 
of IPOs during 1993–1998 was exactly the fixed price offering, in a form of P/E ceiling. 
As the P/E level of stocks at the time of issuance were on average 15, however once the 
trading of the IPO stocks started, the price quickly approached the overall market level. 
During their research period, the average P/E ratio for the whole markets was 36, and on 
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average the P/E ratio of issued stock reached figure 34 by the end of the first trading day. 
The average initial returns indicated similar results, being 178 % during the research 
period, which correlates well with the increase of P/E ratios during the first trading day.  
 
6.3. Determinants of underpricing 
Allocation, Supply and Demand 
The main regulatory body, the CSRC has a strong control over China’s stock market, 
especially in terms of primary markets, which are heavily regulated. The strong control 
is especially targeted towards the timing of IPOs, pricing- and allocation mechanisms of 
IPOs as well as controlling that which companies can go public. (Tian 2011: 81.) Several 
researched from the IPO underpricing in these circumstances considered that the early 
allocation method called lottery, accounted for a lot of the underpricing of IPOs. When 
this method was applied, the IPO stocks priced with fixed price (P/E), were randomly 
distributed to the investors in the markets. Su (2004) and Chi & Padgett (2005) considered 
that there was a strong imbalance between supply and demand, as the demand was 
significantly higher and therefore only a small fraction of the subscriptions acquitted 
stocks from the lottery. Thereby the chances of achieving stocks from the lottery 
depended on the amount of money joining the lottery.  According to their study, there 
was a strong negative relationship between market-adjusted initial returns and the odds 
of “winning” the lottery. Due to the strong demand the stocks were easily overvalued, as 
more and more investors were willing to invest in a specific IPO. Guo & Brooks (2008) 
received similar results, and concluded that when lottery system was applied, part of the 
underpricing can be explained with the imbalance of supply and demand. Since the lottery 
system has become less relevant in China, they focused on book-building method and on 
Secondary Market Proportional Offering (SMP) which the CSRC introduced as a new 
distribution mechanism in 2002. When SMP is used, the new IPO stocks are distributed 
proportionally to investors based on the market value of their existing secondary market 
holdings. Consequently, investors with larger previous holding had a greater chance to 
obtain relatively bigger proportion of stocks from the IPO. According to their findings, 
the usage of SMP combined with book-building process can reduce the level of 
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underpricing, as issuing IPO became more efficient due to the reduce in the level of 
underpricing and increase in the stability of offering price.      
According to Su & Fleisher (1999) fixed price offerings and lottery mechanisms should 
be considered only as a way to allocate oversubscribed stocks. They claim that the usage 
of these mechanisms should not be used for defining the aftermarket value or the initial 
supply of shares. Therefore, these mechanisms cannot cause the underpricing of initial 
public offerings.   
The general demand for all kind of securities is strong in China’s stock markets. When 
the IPOs are issued by using the fixed price offerings, investors were aware of the high 
possibility that the issues will on average be underpriced. Therefore, the risk related to 
the IPOs is obviously a lot smaller compared to the secondary markets. Since the IPOs 
are systematically underpriced in most scenarios, with speculating those investors are able 
to make almost guaranteed profit with a very low risk, if they only will obtain stocks form 
the lottery. (Chang, Chen, Chi & Young 2008: 10, 14.) Due to the possibility of Chinese 
individual investors being inexperienced, it is also possible that their bullish behavior 
drives the stock prices up since they are not able to define the realistic values of stocks 
and corporations (Chen, Firth, Kim 2000: 336). According to Chan, Wang & Wei (2004) 
the demand of domestic markets is not enough of powerful to generate high initial returns, 
instead the limited and regulated supply of IPO stocks by CSRC creates underpricing and 
overvaluation. 
Time gap, liquidity risk and ex ante uncertainty 
Several researches from China’s IPO markets consider that the time gap is significant 
factor explaining the underpricing of IPOs. Mok & Hui (1998) investigated the influences 
of length of time gap between offering and listing on the underpricing of IPOs. They 
found a strong positive relationship between the level of underpricing and number of days 
between offering and listing. The longer time gap increased the uncertainty among 
investors and therefore greater level of underpricing is required in order to satisfy and 
convince the investors, thereby the increase in the time gap also produces ex ante 
uncertainty and asymmetric information. Tian’s (2011) results also confirmed the 
importance of time gap, according to his cross-sectional regression model the time gap 
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accounted for approximately 30 % of the variance of initial returns (adjusted R-square), 
if the comparison was proceeded inside certain industry. In circumstances of long time 
gap, it is possible that the performance of given corporation might vary, thereby 
increasing the uncertainty related to issuing corporation, and confirming the consistency 
with ex ante uncertainty hypothesis.      
The findings of Chen et al. (2000) suggested that the increase in days between offering 
and listing increased the level of underpricing due to the weaker market liquidity of IPOs 
during that period, as those are difficult to liquidate. They distinguished their IPO sample 
from years 1992 to 1995, into two portfolios, depending on whether the length of listing 
gap exceeded 2 months or not. The difference between these two portfolios was huge, 
when the gap exceeded 2 months the market-adjusted initial returns were on average 456 
%, and if the gap was less than 2 months, the corresponding ratio was 128 %. Chan et al. 
(2004) investigated the time gaps and results reported that the median gap was 143 days 
in 1993, and 34 days in 1998. Results indicated that the time gap had shortened 
significantly in subsequent years, yet there was no mention about the importance of time 
gaps in terms of underpricing, or differences in the initial returns whether the time gap 
was over or under median.  
Further research from Chen et al. (2004) performed corresponding tests as previous, 
however with bigger sample size, containing 701 IPOs issued between 1992 and 1997. 
Methods remained same, as they compared the initial returns whether the listing gap was 
over or under 2 months. Results showed more significant difference with this data sample, 
if the gap was greater than 2 months, initial returns were on average 631 %, whereas if 
the gap was shorter than 2 months the comparable ratio was 110 %. According to their 
interpretation this is caused by the long lock-up period when investors are not able to 
liquidate these holdings. Due to this lack of liquidity for the stocks, the investors are not 
able to define the real values of these stocks and in order to receive full subscription for 
stocks, those need to be issued with offsetting discount. (Chen et al. 2004: 291–293.)  
Since the companies between samples are rather well distributed, as the group with gap 
under 2 month contained 404 companies and the group with gap exceeding 2 months 
accounted for 297 companies, these results can be considered as reliable and describing 
well the circumstances under variation of time gap.  
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Yu & Tse (2006) claimed the time gap between offering and listing is unable explain 
strong underpricing of initial public offerings. The research investigated companies in 
which the government was a blockholder. According to the results, investors maintained 
higher confidence towards the issuing company if the government remained as 
blockholder after the issue, since the government reduced the future uncertainty of issuing 
company as it required higher retention of equity, thus the issuing company was able to 
sell the stocks to the markets without such high discount.   
These researches are not fully comparable since Yu & Tse considered the effects of 
governmental ownership, as Chen et al. did not mention about it. Despite that, there is no 
arguing of the importance of time gap, and its length. The decrease of liquidity in terms 
of increased listing gap, is partially able to account for the increase of initial returns and 
level of underpricing. As other possible reason, the rapid development of China’s stock 
markets during 1990s and thereby constantly increased unpredictable regulation might 
have caused increase in uncertainty among issuing companies and investors. Hence, also 
increasing the ex ante uncertainty, as the investors might have required more returns on 
their investments due to the increase of risk. From another point of view, the issuing 
companies might not have been sure from their realistic value, yet being willing to receive 
full subscription on their stocks, and therefore willing to underprice their stocks.       
Signaling hypothesis  
Several studies have supported the signaling hypothesis, as others have argued against it, 
thereby its explanatory power is contradictory in circumstances of Chinese IPOs. Su & 
Fleisher (1999) studied the hypothesis in China during 1987–1995, and their results were 
consistent and supported the theory. If Chinese IPO companies had underpriced their 
issue with greater discount, they were more likely able to obtain higher price and volume 
in the subsequent offerings.  
Yu & Tse (2006) questioned the significance and existence of signaling hypothesis in the 
Chinese markets. Their research argued that abnormally high initial returns in the initial 
public offering cannot be explained with the relative size of the SEO. Their main 
objectives were to investigate the stock-price response to the announcement of SEO, post-
issue returns and underpricing in order to find the relationship, and the study was 
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completed with a sample of 215 IPOs. According to the results, by the time of the 
publishing of SEO prospectus, the SEO news were not new, as the stock price already 
accounted for that. Su (2004) also received results which were not able to confirm the 
signaling hypothesis, and based on the results it was more likely that ex ante uncertainty 
and winner’s curse had greater explanatory power for IPO underpricing.   
As a reminder, the research periods differed from each other’s, as Su & Fleisher were 
able to confirm the existence of signaling hypothesis during 1987–1995 and after that era, 
none of the researches have supported the theory, thereby the contradictions can maybe 
be partially explained with the difference in the time frame. However, it is also worth 
noticing that when the hypothesis received support, the only possible way of pricing the 
IPO was to use the P/E ratio based fixed price formula, and on average the initial returns 
were roughly 950 % during the research period. Consequently, there is another 
contradiction with the results, even though the t-values and coefficients would receive 
significant levels, is there rational causal relationship between the measured factors? As 
previously mentioned, if the issuing company is not even able to decide their issuing 
price, how are they able to signal their excellence by using their issuing price for that 
purpose?    
Winner’s curse 
Su (2004) completed a set of empirical tests during 1994–1999, which received strong 
support in terms of winner’s curse hypothesis. The results showed that in comparison 
between the informed- and uninformed investors, the informed investors obtained stocks 
from IPOs where the initial returns were prominently higher. They divided the investors 
into quintiles, average initial returns for the investors in the highest quintile were 64 %, 
as for the lowest quintile just 17 %. This almost quadruple difference was highly 
significant, verifying the existence of “lemon’s problem”.    
Chi & Padgett (2005), and Yu & Tse (2006) also documented the winner’s curse problem 
among individual Chinese investors, as both papers studied the phenomenon during 
1995–2000. They considered that the winner’s curse problem is more significant in China, 
than in any other emerging market, due to China’s unique market characteristics and 
environment. First of all, over 90 % of all individual investors in China are highly 
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unexperienced in terms of investing, as they also do not have adequate access to relevant 
information. According to them this group of investors accounts for unexperienced, due 
to the large size of it and its vitality to markets, the CSRC is forced to control the prices 
of initial public offerings with P/E ceilings as well as limit the supply of IPO stocks in 
order them to have high initial returns, and by these means they pursue to keep 
uninformed investors satisfied and operating in the markets. Secondly, the China’s stock 
markets can be considered as relatively immature, which have weak market efficiency. 
The poor availability of relevant information is real problem for this group of individual 
investors, and it makes the relative proportion of uninformed investors significantly 
greater, in comparison to any other emerging country.         
Investor sentiment 
Gao researched the IPO underpricing and initial returns by using three factors which were 
market sentiment, the individual investor subscription and behavioral theory, between 
years 2006 and 2008. The comparison accounting for the differences between the first-
day end price of an IPO and the fundamental value of IPO were derived with the industry 
median P/E ratio, and the study gave strong signs that the investor sentiment has a higher 
probability to generate overvaluation among the individual investors. Their research 
suggests the higher level of underpricing is not an effect of positive primary market return, 
instead positive primary market returns have higher probability to reduce underpricing. 
According to these previously mentioned results, they were convinced that the 
underwriter and IPO company are willing to maximize the offer price in circumstances 
of high investor sentiment, and thereby take advantage of the bullish behavior of 
individual investors. The research was unable to ensure and find evidence for hypothesis 
where the IPOs are more underpriced if the markets are cold, and investor sentiment is 
on lower level. (Gao 2010: 78–88.) 
Song et al. (2014) examined 948 Chinese IPOs issued during 2006–2011, as they were 
researching the overvaluation and underpricing. They did not find any support for theory 
that there exists a relationship between investor sentiment and IPO underpricing. 
However, their results presented a positive relationship between overvaluation and 
investor sentiment. They considered the overvaluation accounts for more than the 
underpricing in terms of initial returns, in China’s IPO markets. Their results suggested 
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the initial returns which were on average 66 %, consisted from underpricing with weight 
of approx. 14–22 % and from overvaluation with weight of approx. 44–53 %. The 
research divided the initial returns to overvaluation and underpricing by comparing the 
offering price to the fundamental price of the stock and to first-day market close price.   
The presented contradictive results will not necessarily deny the existence of the investor 
sentiment theory in China’s IPO markets, which considers that when the sentiment among 
investors is low, the companies are willing to underprice their IPOs as a proof of full 
subscription. Worth noticing that the CSRC regulates the timing of IPOs, hence the CSRC 
might have been avoiding issues during cold markets since large IPOs attach lots of 
capital, which are attractive too, and if there is no inflow of money to the markets, the 
supply of capital is limited. The investors have to sell a part of their exiting holdings, 
which might cause more adverse effects in the markets. As also known, there exists a 
greater chance of fail in the IPO if it is issued in cold market conditions. Results of these 
researches are consistent and offer a strong sign that most of the Chinese individual 
investors act bullishly and are uninformed. Obviously the asymmetry of information is 
strong in the China’s IPO markets. The lack of information among individual investors 
can also create information cascades, and information cascades and investor sentiment 
have multiple common factors. The results seem to support the theory as well, despite 
none of the research mentions this. 
Underwriter reputation 
While examining the underpricing of IPOs in China, Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) included 
variable measuring the importance of underwriter reputation. With a dummy variable 
accounting for if the IPO was underwritten by one of the six largest underwriters in China, 
they received results which were insignificant (t-value = 1,71), though consistent with the 
theory since the initial returns were lower if the IPO was underwritten by better 
underwriter. The study was conducted with data covering 701 issues issued in 1992–1997. 
Su & Bangassa (2011a) researched the underwriter’s impact on initial returns with more 
accurate measures, with 590 IPOs issued in both Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2001–
2008. They had three proxies measuring for measuring the excellence of underwriter, first 
accounts for the registered amount of capital, the most prestigious underwriters have 
highest amount of capital. Second proxy measures the relative market share of IPOs 
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issued by underwriters, more accurately the relative amount of issued gross proceeds by 
a given underwriter in comparison to all issued gross proceeds. During the research period 
the top 10 underwriters (out of all 57) issued 80,62 % of all IPO gross proceeds to the 
markets. The last proxy measured the quantity of IPOs issued by each underwriter, with 
an assumption that the more IPOs underwriters have managed, they also possess higher 
reputation. Comparison between groups (low, medium & high) with pairwise tests gave 
no statistical support that the initial returns would be different between groups. The results 
were same for each proxy. Cross-sectional regression results were in line with pairwise 
test results, none of the proxies reached 5 % statistical significance, though all of them 
indicated that the IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters experienced lower market-
adjusted initial returns. 
Since both studies from different eras found no statistical significance, it is possible the 
underwriter reputation is not a significant factor in China, or the market inefficiency and 
irrational behavior among individual investors may explain why these models are not able 
to capture the phenomenon, if it even exists in Chinese IPO markets. Perhaps with more 
accurate subsamples some evidence could be found.  
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6.4. Long-term performance of Chinese IPOs 
The weak long-term performance of Chinese IPOs is documented in multiple studies, 
however mostly with different point of views and from different eras. Hence, comparing 
the results is not unambiguous, as the circumstances and regulatory environment are 
different almost in every study. Table 2 presents the conducted studies which will also be 
discussed below.  
Table 2. Historical evidence of the IPO underpricing and long-term 
underperformance in China 
        Long-term 
performance 
(%) 
Wealth 
relative Paper 
Research 
period  
Sample 
size 
Initial returns 
(%) 
Mok & Hui (1998) 1990-93 86 289.00 -  - 
Chen, Firth & Kim (2000) 1992-95 277 350.47 -21.20 0.8368 
Chan, Wang & Wei 
(2004) 1993-98 570 178.00 - 0.924 
Su & Bangassa (2011) 2001-2006 391 96.90 -18.16 - 
Song, Tan & Yi (2014) 2006-2011 948 66.00 4.10 - 
Table above presents the relevant long-term performance studies conducted in China. Initial return 
measures are not equal in all studies since some of them apply raw- and some market-adjusted returns. 
Long-term performance accounts for 3-year holding period return, except in study conducted by Mok & 
Hui. Depending on the study the benchmarks vary. Table will not present long-term performance ratios 
or wealth relatives if those are not available for the entire sample. Wealth relative accounts for the 
presented long-term performance figure. All studies will be discussed below 
Mok & Hui (1998) were the first to examine the aftermarket performance of Chinese 
IPOs. They researched the excess cumulative returns (mean of stock returns minus the 
Scholes-Williams beta-adjusted market returns) of 86 A-series IPOs during 1990–1993, 
while pursuing answer for the existence of aftermarket inefficiency in forms of 
speculation or fads. Based on the initial returns the sample was divided into two group, 
underpriced and overpriced IPOs. From the early trading days, the overpriced IPOs 
outperformed the underpriced by a significant difference. The excess returns of 
overpriced IPOs were positive the whole 350-trading day (approx. 1,5 years) research 
period, being around 25 % in the end of the period. Correspondingly the underpriced IPOs 
experienced negative excess returns till 75-trading days, during the subsequent 
observation period the excess returns of underpriced IPOs were positive as well, however 
being positive by only few percentages. The results are contradictory with previous 
studies of speculation from other markets, since usually IPOs started to experience 
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negative returns after one year the due to the burst of investors’ expectations. Hence, it 
can be considered the Chinese aftermarkets were systematically inefficient, rather than 
speculative. However, the sample is rather small in order to represent robust results, as 
the research period may not be able to capture the whole phenomenon. 
Subsequent study of the long-term performance of Chinese IPOs conducted by Chen et 
al. (2000) measured the buy-and-hold period returns of 1-, 2- and 3-year, also focusing 
on the cross-sectional determinants of the aftermarket performance. They observed 277 
IPOs issued in both, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1992–1995. 
Average one-year market-adjusted holding period return was approx. 20 %, two-year 
holding period return was few percentages positive in Shanghai as it was few percentages 
negative in Shenzhen. The largest gap was in the three-year holding period returns, IPOs 
issued in Shanghai experienced an average return of -26,06 %, while the IPOs issued in 
Shenzhen outperformed them significantly by being -8,27 %. The results indicate the 
about the existence of speculation on the market since the returns faced a downward 
trajectory after one year, and turned negative before three years. Thus, the results are 
consistent with the theory. The above represented listing lag also seemed to be able to 
explain the differences in three-year holding period returns. Whether the gap was under 
or over two months, the average returns were -8,47 % and -27,16 %. Due to the increased 
uncertainty in long listing gap IPOs, the initial returns increased. It also correlated 
negatively with the aftermarket performance, however the statistical relation of this is not 
represented in the research, only in descriptive table. Further in the paper, the results of 
the multivariate regressions reveal the explanatory power of listing gap in terms of 3-year 
holding period return, the slope coefficient is negative, yet it did not reach any kind of 
statistical significance (t-value -0,4238). The most important variables explaining the 
aftermarket performance were age of the company, if the company accomplished SEO 
subsequent to the IPO (dummy) and the issuing year (dummy). The higher age of the 
company indicated worse long-term performance, as a result being totally contradictorily 
with findings of Ritter (1991) from U.S. markets. If the company accomplished SEO 
during the three-year observation period, its performance was significantly better by 
being 19,63 % higher. The issuing year had the strongest impact on the long-term 
performance, if IPO was issued in 1992 the long-term performance was on average 50,57 
% better. However, in these circumstances it is obvious the year of issuance mainly 
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accounts for the macroeconomic factors and general conditions of stock markets. 
Statistical support was not given for factors which usually explain the phenomenon, such 
as: initial returns, amounts of assets before going public and the rate of earnings growth 
during the three-year aftermarket period. They conclude the regression model of 16 
explanatory variables having either poor or moderate ability to explain the long-term 
performance of IPOs, however noting the markets are rather new and undeveloped, 
leading into market inefficiency.  
Chan et al. (2004) followed Ritter’s procedure and formed three benchmarks (size-
matched, B/M matched and size- & B/M matched portfolios) in order to measure the post-
issue performance of IPOs. The sample contained 570 IPOs issued in 1993–1998. 
Throughout the sample, the IPOs experienced positive cumulative returns, on average the 
12-, 24- and 36-month returns were 11,55 %, 30,66 % and 75,07 %. In comparison to the 
benchmark portfolios, the IPOs underperformed them systematically, although not by 
much. Wealth relatives were only few decimals away from one, therefore the level of 
underpricing can be considered modest in comparison to for example Japanese IPOs 
which wealth relatives ranged from 0,67 to 0,77, when measured over the three-year 
holding period. During this era, the pricing of IPOs was regulated with P/E ratio ceiling 
of 15, and all IPOs were issued with that price. However, the general market P/E ratio 
was on average 33,2–38,39, on the listing day the P/E ratios of issuing companies peaked 
to 34,65, on average. The after P/E ratios for 1, 2 and 3 years were 29,5; 31,09 and 38,9. 
The development of P/E ratios indicates the IPOs will be overpriced by investors right 
after entering the secondary markets, and the fads drive prices up until investors in the 
markets realize the overreaction. Around year after the issuance the valuation has 
moderated on the realistic level, and afterwards it starts to grow again depending on the 
performance of company. The paper considers also the effects of the changes in ROA, 
operating cash flow on assets, net sales growth, net sales over assets and growth rate of 
capital expenditures. All changes in the variables were defined as the difference between 
one year before the issue, till the end of holding period. Measured over one and two years, 
ROA, operating cash flow on assets and growth rate of net sales received statistical 
significance with positive relationship in explaining the holding period returns. However, 
only the growth rate of net sales was able to explain the three-year holding period returns. 
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These findings confirm the later performance of company’s stock is not driven by 
speculation, more likely the price reflects the operation performance of company.  
Su and Bangassa (2011b) accomplished a research concerning on the long-term 
performance of Chinese IPOs and underwriter reputation’s effects on it. The data covered 
391 IPOs issued during 2001–2006. During the research period the IPOs underperformed 
the benchmark (SHSE & SZSE A-Share Index) systematically. The abnormal buy-and-
hold period returns of 1-, 2- and 3-year were on average, -6,01 %, -14,57 % and -18,16 
%. The comparison between 3-year holding period returns when IPOs were divided into 
three groups depending on the underwriter reputation reveals the importance of it. The 
IPOs issued by the best underwriters experienced on average an abnormal 3-years holding 
period return of -0,45 %, as the IPOs issued by the underwriters with lowest reputation 
generated an abnormal return of -42,91 %. T-values for differences in subsamples reached 
1 % significance level in two pairwise group comparisons: low vs. medium & low vs. 
high. Group medium vs. high reached the statistical significance only at 10 % level. The 
cross-sectional OLS regression reports similar results, the better the underwriter the better 
the long-term performance of an IPO. The larger size of the issues also indicated about 
the better aftermarket performance, as did the EPS ratio, both having positive relationship 
at 1 % significance level. The fraction of tradable shares by the total shares outstanding 
had only moderate positive relationship with aftermarket performance, at 10 % level. 
Obviously, the standard deviation of returns of a given company had a negative and 
significant relationship (at 5 % level) with aftermarket performance. The average 3-month 
return of A-share index before the offering had no explanatory power, neither did the 
dummy variable accounting for the IPO companies if they operated in tech related 
industry.  
Song et al. (2014) examined the long-term performance of IPOs issued in 2006–2011, 
with a comprehensive sample of 948 IPOs. Being consistent with previous studies they 
measured the 1-, 2-, and 3-year abnormal buy-and-hold period returns.  As explanatory 
variables they used the uncertainty related to the issuing company (variance/mean of 
forecasted prices by analysts), EPS, age, size of the issuance and investors sentiment. The 
average buy-and-hold period returns for 1, 2 and 3 years were -14,4 %, -17,7 % and -7,9 
%. The initial returns had statistically the strongest impact on buy-and-hold period 
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returns, consistent with the theory, the relationship between them is negative in each 
group. Interestingly, initial returns had lower explanatory power with shorter buy-and-
hold period, as the explanatory power grew more than double between years one and two. 
EPS had positive relationship with returns in each group, being significant at 5 % level, 
though the impact was not that strong. Age of the company had no statistical explanatory 
power in any group, this might reflect the transformation of markets and companies, since 
it strongly argues with the theory and previous studies from Chinese IPOs issued in early 
1990s’ (Chen, Firth & Kim 2000). As mentioned in previous subchapter, they also 
researched the initial returns, whether the underpricing or overvaluation was more 
significant. Initial returns and overvaluation both had significant negative relationship 
with long-term aftermarket performance, though according to the results the 
overvaluation had better predicting power in terms of aftermarket performance.      
        
6.5. Summary 
Based on the above discussed researches the underpricing of IPOs has been statistically 
very significant phenomenon in China, however it has been weakening. There is a lack 
of researches conducted in Chinese IPO market circumstances, due to that all IPO 
underpricing theories cannot be justified with earlier researches. The most important 
reason for IPO underpricing in China have seemed to be the regulatory environment, 
which is unique compared to any other sophisticated markets. CSRC regulated the 
applicable IPO pricing mechanisms, timing of issues which causes listing lags as well as 
the allocation of shares. Hence, some of these produce underpricing by themselves, and 
some of them through asymmetric information theories. After the regulatory 
environment, the asymmetric information theories have the best explanatory power, 
especially winner’s curse and ex ante uncertainty are key factors, both being strengthened 
by the regulatory environment. Part of the factors cause rather overvaluation than 
underpricing, such as fads among investors, investor sentiment and generally the behavior 
of investors. Due to the regulation which forced the companies to underprice their issues, 
the awareness of investors about this, limited supply of shares and high demand due to 
the bullish behavior of investors drive the prices of IPOs up, them exceeding their 
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reasonable values significantly. As a result, all of these together produces strong price 
pressure towards IPOs.  
The long-term underperformance of IPOs exists strongly in China; all studies support the 
theory that IPOs underperform their benchmark indices on 3-year period, depending on 
the used benchmark and research period, the deepness of underperformance varies. When 
the long-term performance of IPOs is examined in steady market conditions, the most 
severe overoptimismn and fads exists during the first year as by the end of second year 
the prices have reached bottom, while the prices tended to recover during the third year. 
In addition, the independent variables explaining the weak long-term performance highly 
depend on the era. In earlier studies, the weak long-term performance was best explained 
with the issuing year and macroeconomic factors, also if the company did not 
accomplished SEO, however, not with initial returns nor with rate of earnings growth. 
Further study considers the long-term performance depends on the growth of net sales 
rather than the growth of ROA or other variables. Only the researches conducted in the 
21st century found consistent result with researches conducted in other markets, as issue 
size, EPS and initial returns explained the long-term performance the best.  
Surprisingly, neither of the studies focusing on the underwriter reputation could not find 
any statistical support for the underwriter reputation to explain the initial returns, although 
it received strong support in explaining the long-term performance. This can be 
interpreted as markets’ inefficiency: underwriters were more aware of the general 
conditions and future performance of companies, presumably behaving rationally; 
however, this was not reflected to the initial trading. If individual investors would act 
rationally and base their investment decisions on facts and rationales, should not this be 
seen during the first trading days as well? Perhaps it could be captured during the first 
trading days, however in that era the IPO pricing was based on the P/E ratios, and if 
general market trades at around 35 and the issue starts at 15, the underwriter reputation is 
not very useful attribute for investors who are looking for short-term profits. Hence, 
speculation and fads indeed exist among Chinese IPOs.  
However, the phenomenon of poor long-term performance has weakened during the 
development of Chinese IPO markets. This development also reflects the increased 
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market efficiency, even on some level, and as presented in previous chapters, there has 
been several reformations in regulations affecting on IPOs. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the results are contradictorily and confusing.   
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7.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Data 
The Data for the study are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream covering 131 
IPOs issued during 2010–2012, accounting for 12,04 % of all IPOs issued during the 
period. The significant lack of data from P/E ratios and other variables caused the 
contraction in the sample size. The data are not normally distributed, neither between 
years nor between stock exchanges, therefore the more accurate examination is not 
possible, since the results might get distorted. Table below exhibits the distribution of 
IPOs in this sample. As the most important note from the table is the quantity of issues in 
each year. Even though the markets were steadily but slowly plunging, there still were 
relatively similar quantity of issues issued to the markets. Hence, it cannot be argued that 
the companies or underwriters would have been pursuing to take advantage of market 
conditions, as the markets were “cold”, already suggesting that fads, speculation and 
overoptimismn are in greater role in this research period.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the distribution of IPOs. 
          
  2010-2012 2010 2011 2012 
All Issued IPOs 1088 377 369 343 
IPOs excluded 957 307 337 314 
All IPOs examined 131 70 32 29 
In Shanghai 20 7 5 8 
In Shenzhen 111 63 27 21 
        
  
 
Concerning on the descriptive statistics which are presented in table 4, the average first 
day P/E ratio of IPOs has decreased significantly during the research period, as it offers 
a rough view of the valuation of companies. From 2010 to 2012 those decreased by half, 
indicating about economic environment. During 2010 the economy in China was growing 
steadily after financial crisis, and the views of economy drove stock prices up. From the 
early 2011 the path has been opposite, the stock indices had started to slip, which is 
reflected to the IPO prices too, causing them to decrease since the uncertainty increased. 
An alternative explanation for the variance of P/E ratios is the deregulation of pricing 
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rule. Companies and underwriters were for the first time able to price issues as they 
wanted. As a result, the average primary market P/E ratio jumped nearly ten times.  The 
ROA ratios (pre-issuing year) are consistent with P/E ratios, since 2010 those have 
decreased also. The largest difference is in issue sizes, from 2011 to 2012 the average 
issue size dropped more than 50 %, although the sample sizes between years 2010 and 
2011 differ remarkably, hence the difference might be a result of not normally distributed 
data. M/B ratios from the trading day are also consistent with other figures, indicating 
about the worse economic views, as the market valuation has slipped in comparison to 
book value. 
  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for P/E, ROA, SIZE & M/B ratios. 
          
  2010-2012 2010 2011 2012 
Mean P/E 120.61 128.47 154.40 64.38 
Mean ROA % 3.73 % 4.20 % 3.25 % 3.13 % 
Mean Size CNY Million 1104.00 1182.92 1360.09 630.93 
Mean M/B 3.73 4.20 3.25 3.13 
          
  
7.2. Methodology 
This study applies the most commonly used methodology in long-term performance 
measures, by pursuing to be consistent with Ritter (1991) and Loughran & Ritter (1995). 
Examination of long-term performance is proceeded over four different time intervals and 
calculated for each initial public offering: 6-month holding period returns, 12-month 
holding period returns, 24-month holding period returns and 36-month holding period 
returns. Afterwards the wealth relatives for each initial public offering are calculated.   
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Initial returns, abnormal returns, holding period returns and wealth relatives 
The raw initial return of a given company is generally defined as the relative difference 
in price between the first trading day close price and issue price. The raw initial returns 
are calculated by applying the formula below:  
(8) 𝐼𝑅𝑖 =  
𝑃𝑖1 − 𝑃𝑖0
𝑃𝑖0
  
where 𝐼𝑅𝑖 = raw initial return of stock i 
 𝑃𝑖1 = first day close price of stock i 
𝑃𝑖0 = price of stock 𝑖 at initial offer 
  
 
The abnormal returns of initial public offerings are defined as the difference between 
stock performance and benchmark performance. This study applies the market-adjusted 
returns, which are calculated as:  
(9) 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 =  
𝑃𝑖1 − 𝑃𝑖0
𝑃𝑖0
−
𝐼1 − 𝐼0
𝐼0
=  𝐼𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑚  
 
 
where  𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 = market-adjusted initial return of stock i 
 𝑃𝑖1 = first day close price of stock i 
𝑃𝑖0 = price of stock i at initial offer 
𝐼1 = index value of the Shanghai/Shenzhen SSE Composite Index at the     
first trading day 
𝐼0 = index value of the Shanghai/Shenzhen SSE Composite Index at the 
offering date 
 𝐼𝑅𝑖 = raw initial return of stock i 
 𝑅𝑚 = return of market index i 
 
The mean abnormal return of a portfolio containing 𝑛 IPO stocks is defined to be the 
equally-weighted arithmetic average of abnormal returns, in this study the average of 
market-adjusted returns:   
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(10) 𝐴𝑅 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
 
where 𝐴𝑅 = average abnormal return 
 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 = market-adjusted return of stock i 
 𝑛 = the quantity of stocks in the portfolio 
 
In order to test the statistical significance of market-adjusted initial returns, the Student’s 
t-test is applied by using the equation below: 
(11) 𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅
𝑠
√𝑛
⁄
 
 
 
where  𝐴𝑅 = average abnormal return 
 𝑠 = standard deviation of market-adjusted initial returns  
 𝑛 = number of observations in the sample 
 𝑡 = Student’s t-test value 
 
The null hypothesis assumes that the average abnormal returns will not significantly differ from 
zero, consequently the initial public offerings are not significantly underpriced.  
𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅 = 0  
 
The long-term performance of IPOs can be measured by comparing the holding period 
returns to the market returns during the same time periods, as the holding period return 
measures the total returns of a stock with buy-and-hold strategy when the IPO stock is 
bought at time t and held for T months. A wealth relative of greater than 1.00 indicates 
that the company outperforms its benchmark, which in this study is either the Shenzhen 
SSE Composite Index or Shanghai SSE Composite Index, depending on the issuing 
exchange. Correspondingly, a wealth relative of less than 1.00 can be interpreted as IPO 
underperforming its benchmark. This study excludes the initial returns from the 
examination of wealth relatives, and is consistent with the methodology Ritter (1991) 
applied. Holding period return for stock when held for T months and excluding initial 
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return is calculated in the first equation below, as the second calculates wealth relatives 
for IPO firm by following way:  
(12) 𝑅𝑖 =  ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=1
  
 
where: 𝑅𝑖 = total return of stock 𝑖 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = raw return of stock at time t 
 
 
(13) 𝑊𝑅𝑖 =  
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
  
 
where 𝑊𝑅𝑖 = wealth relative for stock 𝑖 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = raw return of stock 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
 𝑟𝑚𝑡 = market return at time 𝑡 
 
The method of excluding initial returns from the long-term performance was chosen since 
this study observes two anomalies: initial underpricing and long-term performance. 
Hence, it is more relevant approach to split the time period to two non-overlapping time 
period. As commonly known, the second day returns are far more insignificant than first 
day returns. The results might also be biased if the holding period returns would include 
initial returns, since the market-adjusted initial returns are one of the key independent 
variables in the cross-sectional regressions.   
Cross-sectional regression analysis 
The cross-sectional analysis is used for finding the significance of five applied 
independent variables, for the dependent variable, which is the market-adjusted holding 
period return of 6-, 12-, 24- & 36-month, by applying the OLS multivariate regression 
model. The independent variables are firm specific characteristics, consisting of market-
adjusted initial return, price-to-earnings ratio, logarithmic value of size of the issuance, 
return on assets and market-to-book ratio. Additionally, two non-firm specific dummy 
variables are used: first for the listing stock exchange and the second for the issuing years. 
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Variables, both independent and dependent were chosen based on the previous empirical 
studies and changes in the regulations and issuing environment.  
Price-to-earnings ratio as independent variable is one of the main objectives of this study. 
As mentioned in previous chapters and introduction, the CSRC used to control the price 
of IPOs in the primary market by setting a price ceiling based on the P/E ratio, which was 
not allowed to exceed 15. The CSRC deregulated this rule in June 2009 and afterwards 
the pricing of IPOs has been floating. Due to these changes in the regulation, it is ideal to 
examine whether primary market P/E ratio has a significant relation with long-term 
performance of IPO firms. There were not ready data about the primary market P/E ratios 
in the Thomson Reuters Datastream, instead P/E ratios based on the first day close price. 
Before completing the regressions, the P/E ratios were transformed on primary market 
level by defining the earnings from the relation of given ratios and first day close price. 
Afterwards, the issue prices were divided with earnings in order to get the primary market 
P/E ratio. This study decided to apply the primary market P/E ratio, since the price is not 
yet “discounted by markets”, as it is given to markets. Hence, I expect there to be strong 
relationship between the long-term performance and P/E ratios, since the pricing is no 
more regulated. Theoretically, if the pricing of IPOs in China would be efficient, there 
should not exist any relations, since underwriters would price the issues on reasonable 
levels. However, as previous studies have shown, the initial returns in China are 
enormous, and fads also exist, which are supported by CSRC since it regulates the timing 
of IPOs, I assume the underwriters and companies are willing to take advantage of the 
opportunity to price issues as they see the best. The relation between long-term 
performance and underwriter reputation was documented by Su & Bangassa (2011b), thus 
increasing the probability that P/E ratios can indicate about the aftermarket performance.  
The size of the issuance has been used virtually in all previous studies. Because of the 
possible existence of fads among small IPOs, those might experience greater initial 
returns, which on average have had strong negative relationship with the long-term 
performance. Larger IPOs usually attain more attention at the market, and their pricing is 
more efficient. Therefore, this study focuses on the size of the issuance and on the market-
adjusted initial returns. Previous studies have also documented positive relationship 
between size and long-term performance: relatively bigger IPOs have had better long-
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term performance as the smaller ones have had significantly weaker performance. Due to 
the skewness in data, the size of the issuance is transformed into a logarithmic form, in 
order to receive more robust results. 
ROA (return on assets) is applied as independent variable in order to account for the 
profitability of companies. Profitability is one of the key determinants in the 
prestigiousness and in the pricing of companies. From all different measures of 
profitability, ROA is the most suitable for this purpose, since it focuses on both: debt and 
equity, and it gives larger view of the total performance of companies. Equity/debt ratios 
may vary over the time when companies complete SEOs or raise more debt, hence ROA 
serves this purpose the best when the long-term performance is under examination. The 
most recent pre-issue ROA ratios of IPO companies are used to test if there is a 
relationship between the pre-issue profitability and long-term performance. 
M/B ratio (market-to-book) gives another kind of view about the valuation of companies, 
by focusing on the relative differences between book and market value, as P/E ratio 
accounts for the market value and earnings. The differences between these two ratios 
might differ meaningfully and therefore both are examined. M/B ratio of a given company 
is based on the first trading day close price in this regression. If companies with high M/B 
ratio perform worse in the long-term, it gives a sign about the fads or overoptimismn 
related to the IPOs.  
Dummy variables are created for distinguishing the differences between listing stock 
exchanges and issuing years. SSH dummy variable accounts for the issuing stock 
exchange, by receiving a figure of one if the company is issued in Shenzhen stock 
exchange, and zero if issued in Shanghai. The distribution of IPOs between these two 
stock exchanges is meaningful, and the quantity of IPOs issued in Shanghai is too low for 
completing regressions in different samples since the preconditions for accurate 
regression analysis are not fulfilled. Therefore, the study applies dummy variable for the 
difference in stock exchanges. YEAR dummy variable captures the differences in issuing 
years, if issued in 2010 or 2011 the dummy receives a value of zero and if in 2012, it 
receives a value of one. The direction of both indices has steadily and slowly headed 
downwards since 2010, however, when the attention is on the long-term performance of 
IPOs (36 months), the long-term performance of IPOs issued in 2012 might bias the 
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results upwards due to the rapid and strong growth in indices in mid-2014. Hence, the 
dummy pursues more accurate results by controlling the market conditions.  
Following regressions are examined with a null hypothesis that the there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. 
Due to the strong correlation between MAIR, P/E and MB ratios, those are not included 
to same model in order to avoid multicollinearity and biased results. Regression results 
and correlation matrix are presented in the next chapter.     
 
(14) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀  
(15) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃/𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀  
(16) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀  
(17) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀  
(18) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀  
(19) 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴   
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀 
 
(20) 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃/𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽6𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀 
 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑡 = abnormal (market-adjusted) 6-, 12-, 24- or 36-month holding period 
return 
 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅 = market-adjusted initial return 
 𝑃/𝐸 = first day price-to-earnings ratio 
 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = logarithmic size of the issuance 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = return on assets ratio in the issuing year (pre-issue) 
 𝑀𝐵 = market-to-book ratio on the issuing day 
𝑆𝑆𝐻 = dummy variable for stock exchanges, receives a figure of 1 if 
issued in Shenzhen and 0 if in Shanghai 
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 = dummy variable for issuing years, receives a figure of 1 if issued 
in 2012 and 0 if in 2010–2011 
73 
 
Alternative approaches to the long-term performance of IPOs 
There are various methods to determine the long-term performance of IPO companies, 
however most of them apply either the buy-and-hold period returns or wealth relatives. 
Greatest differences in the models are results of different benchmarks, or applications of 
portfolios. The long-term performance of an IPO firm is determined based on its 
benchmark, and depending on the study the benchmarks vary. The figure below gives a 
perfect example about the significance of benchmark. One may indicate that the long-
term performance is great, as another may claim it to be substantially weak. 
 
Figure 4.) Cumulative average adjusted returns for an equally-weighted portfolio of 1526 IPOs issued in 
U.S. between 1975 and 1984, with monthly rebalancing (Ritter 1991: 11). 
 
Depending on the case the most suitable benchmark also varies. In general, adjusting the 
returns of IPO companies to whole market’s return can be considered as inaccurate, due 
to the differences. The whole market’s beta is one, and usually IPOs contain more risk 
and are more volatile, beta exceeding one. The entire market composes from all kinds of 
firms from different industries and from different sizes. Is it relevant benchmark? Yes 
and no. The results are not the most accurate, however those are able to give a rough view 
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about the performance. On the other hand, if the benchmark portfolio composes from a 
small group of accurately matching firms, it is more sensitive to the performance of one 
company. This might or might not influence biased results, since the sample is 
meaningfully smaller. Hence, the application of more accurate model requires the markets 
to be more efficient. If the markets are not enough of efficient, the pricing of IPOs on the 
secondary market presumably differs from the pricing of already exiting and matching 
firms. With the possible existence of fads in the markets, the determination of relevant 
benchmark becomes trickier. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, China’s domestic IPO markets cannot be considered 
to be highly efficient. Individual investors do not possess access to the information, 
instead their actions are irrational and depending on the market conditions, bullish or 
bearish. Behavior and sentiment play key roles among underpricing of IPOs, therefore, I 
consider the application of market indices to be adequate benchmark as a first step for 
determining the long-term performances of Chinese IPOs.  
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8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
8.1. Initial returns 
The first glimpse on the results of initial returns reveals unexpected figures. The 
underpricing phenomenon has been significant issue over the time, hence strongly 
negative results seem dubious. Both classes, raw return and market-adjusted initial return 
states the high negative initial returns do not exist anymore.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for RAW IR and MAIR. 
          
  2010-2012 2010 2011 2012 
Mean RAW IR % 
(t-value) 
-47.08 % 
(-13,87***) 
-43.90 % 
(-9,69***) 
-60.43 % 
(-9,96***) 
-40.04 % 
(-5,19***) 
Mean MAIR % 
(t-value) 
-46,49 % 
(-13,53***) 
-42,69 % 
(-9,01***) 
-60,03 % 
(-9,86***) 
-40,71 % 
(-5,46***) 
          
Median RAW IR % -55.43 % -54.15 % -67.51 % -53.13 % 
Median MAIR % -56.06 % -52.58 % -71,28 % -51.82 % 
 
*     statistically significant at 0,10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0,05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0,01 level 
 
 
More accurate comparison between already conducted studies reveals that the results are 
extremely contaminated. Song et al. (2014) included substantially more companies to 
their sample, receiving highly contradictory results compared to these. The sample 
contained 336 IPOs issued in 2010 and 275 IPOs issued in 2011 (nearly all issued IPOs), 
as the corresponding quantities in this study are 70 and 32. However, the study completed 
by Song et al. does not have results about the IPOs issued in 2012, and hereby the 
robustness of the results is incomparable. The figure on the next page shows the level of 
initial returns in their study, the complete bar accounts for the level of initial returns. As 
it shows, the initial returns weakened meaningfully from 2010 to 2011, and the results of 
this study are in line as well, since the initial returns surged even more. Due to the 
contradiction, observing the statistical significance of the results of this study is irrelevant.  
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Figure 5.) IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation during 2006–2011 Song, Tan & Yi (2014: 43). 
 
In these circumstances, the evaluation of initial returns cannot be completed enough of 
accurately with a sample covering only 12,04 % of issued IPOs. More comprehensive 
data sample is required in order to receive robust results, and this sample accounts for all 
data available from Thomson Reuters Datastream. When the market-adjusted initial 
returns were observed, only 18 IPOs experienced positive returns, as the rest, 113 
experienced negative returns. As a conclusion, these results should not be trusted.  
Findings about the underpricing of IPOs based on this study suggests that IPOs have not 
been statistically underpriced during 2010–2012, and during this era there was no clear 
path about the level of underpricing. However, as I already confirmed, these results 
cannot be trusted since the sample is so small and the more comprehensive study by Song 
et al. (2014) clarified that during 2010 and 2011 IPOs were significantly underpriced, 
though their level of underpricing weakened substantially between 2010 and 2011. 
Consequently, based on this study, I am not able to reject or confirm the first two 
hypotheses. Sample is too small in order to receive accurate and truthful results.   
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8.2. Long-term performance 
The long-term performance of the IPOs examined in this study is first observed with the 
market-adjusted holding period returns, while the initial returns are excluded. During the 
first year, the initial public offerings have not been good investments in China as those 
underperformed the markets throughout the sample. IPOs issued in 2010 seem to be 
overpriced the in primary sales or on the first trading day, as those did not start to perform 
better even after 3 years. However, the IPOs issued in 2011 and 2012 started to perform 
better after one year, and eventually surging during the third year. Examination of the 
arithmetic means of the entire sample is irrelevant due to the general surge of indices in 
China as the results are probably biased. However, when IPOs are issued in stable market 
conditions, as in 2010, those are lousy long-term investments in China, at least with this 
sample. Results are presented in table 6.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of 6-, 12-, 24- & 36-month market-adjusted 
holding period returns. 
          
  2010-2012 2010 2011 2012 
Mean MAHPR 6 Months % 
(t-value) 
-5.80 % 
(-2,76***) 
-5.39 % 
(-1,54) 
-4.98 % 
(-2,23**) 
-7.71 % 
(-2,19**) 
Mean MAHPR 12 Months % 
(t-value) 
-9.20 % 
(-3,53***) 
-9.68 % 
(-2,37**) 
-6.97 % 
(-1,63) 
-10.49 % 
(-2,48**) 
Mean MAHPR 24 Months % 
(t-value) 
0.82 % 
(0,19) 
-9.93 % 
(-2,59**) 
-5.63 % 
(-0,89) 
33.86 % 
(-2,38**) 
Mean MAHPR 36 Months % 
(t-value) 
7.79 % 
(1,15) 
-9.83 % 
(-1,73*) 
12.74 % 
(1,40) 
44.84 % 
(1,89*) 
 
Median MAHPR 6 Months % -10.48 % -13.00 % -4.98 % -14.02 % 
Median MAHPR 12 Months % -15.66 % -19.26 % -11.20 % -15.22 % 
Median MAHPR 24 Months % -11.28 % -17.58 % -15.40 % 13.57 % 
Median MAHPR 36 Months % -15.64 % -21.94 % -8.15 % 4.19 % 
          
*     statistically significant at 0,10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0,05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0,01 level 
 
Median figures offer a better view to the reality than arithmetic means, since if the data 
sample is skewed with high outliers the results are easily biased. According to these 
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figures, the data are significantly skewed, since IPOs issued in 2011 no more produced 
positive returns, and the 2- and 3-year market-adjusted holding period returns of IPOs 
issued in 2012 were substantially lower. If chronologically examined, the long-term 
performance seems to improve year by year, eventually turning positive.  
Table 7. Wealth relatives of Chinese IPOs. 
          
  2010-2012 2010 2011 2012 
6-Month 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.92 
12-Month 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
24-Month 1.01 0.88 0.93 1.31 
36-Month 1.07 0.88 1.15 1.24 
          
          
The alternative way of presenting the long-term performance is the wealth relatives, 
which are presented in table above (7). As expected, the results of 6- and 12-month 
holding period are in line with previous ones. Suspiciously, the 3-year holding period 
return of IPOs issued in 2011, and 2- and 3-year holding period return of IPOs issued in 
2012 were the only wealth relatives exceeding one. The big underlying question is that 
for how much of the surge do the market conditions account for? As the figure 6 on the 
next page shows, the indices surged significantly as of mid-2014, which may have caused 
investor sentiment to be on a high level, increasing the bullish behavior of investors. 
However, SSH & SSE composite indices account for all A-series stocks in the exchange, 
based on their market value. This set of IPOs issued during 2011 and 2012 outperformed 
the markets substantially, which suggests them to be more sensitive to market changes, 
in other words, their beta exceeds one significantly. This rationale supports my previous 
consideration that the market-adjusted holding period returns are not the most reliable in 
terms of measuring long-term performance.  
However, based on these results, it cannot be robustly concluded if IPOs were profitable 
long-term investments, since the market conditions might have affected strongly on the 
performance of IPOs.  After examining the cross-sectional results, I suggest 
improvements for subsequent studies in order to receive more accurate results in 
measuring the long-term performance of IPOs in China. 
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Figure 6.) Shanghai & Shenzhen Composite Indices chart. Shanghai denoted with orange color, Shenzhen 
with blue. (Bloomberg 2016). 
 
8.3. Cross-sectional results 
Table 8 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between explanatory variables. 
Market-adjusted initial returns have strong negative correlation with price-to-earnings 
ratio and strong positive correlation with market-to-book ratio. This might cause 
multicollinearity in the regression results, otherwise all variables are eligible for 
completing the regression analysis. Due to these limitations, we cannot include all 
variables into a single model.    
Table 8. Pearson correlation coefficients for independent variables. 
 Mair P/E LnSize ROA M/B 
Mair 1.00  -0.5886*** 0.0119 -0.1644* 0.3708*** 
P/E -0.5886*** 1.00  0.0304 0.0105 -0.0458 
LnSize 0.0119 0.0304 1.00  0.1283 -0.0158 
ROA -0.1644* 0.0105 0.1283 1.00  -0.0473 
M/B 0.3708*** -0.0458 -0.0158 -0.0473 1.00  
            
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level   
 
On a 6-month holding period, positive and high market-adjusted holding period returns 
indicate poor and significant long-term performance for an IPO. This supports the general 
theory that strong positive initial returns are a result of speculation and high expectations, 
and on longer term markets notice the companies are not as valuable as expected. 
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However, the results are contradictory with study from Song et al. (2014), which was 
unable to find a relation during shorter holding period, instead the relation was significant 
only after one year. The second finding is more interesting, P/E ratios have extremely 
significant and positive relationship with the 6-month holding period return, and the 
highest explanatory power. At first, one could assume the high P/E ratios indicate the 
offerings to be overpriced, as those probably were as well. This rationale would also 
suggest the long-term performance should be weak (similarly as with market-adjusted 
initial returns). Even the “hot market” conditions cannot explain this relationship, since 
the stock indices plunged steadily before the peak of 2014, while the range of this 
regression reaches only mid-2013. Hence, it might be that the investors’ excess 
expectations are not completely faded after 6 months of holding. The M/B ratios have 
strong negative relationship also, being in support of theory that low M/B ratios indicate 
better long-term performance, revealing that the level of pricing is an important factor. 
As a reminder, the applied M/B ratio is the M/B ratio in the end of the first trading day, 
hence the negative initial returns have already discounted this factor and therefore these 
results can be considered obvious. Returns on assets received only moderate statistical 
support that the more profitable companies perform better during the first 6 months. Fads 
and speculation around the IPOs might have disturbed the efficient pricing of stocks, as 
the performance of recently issued IPOs can be better explained with other variables, 
hence the statistical significance is only moderate. Surprisingly, the size of the issuance 
received no support as in most markets there is a negative but significant relationship. On 
a 6-month holding period there were no statistically significant differences between the 
stock exchanges or issuing years. 
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Table 9. OLS Regression results of 6-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. Individual independent variables with SSH & 
YEAR dummy. 
              
  
Coeff.        
(t-value) 
        R-square 
Intercept 
-8.434             
(-1.48) 
-13.619                          
(-2.40**) 
-106.09          
(-1.23) 
-14.853       
(-2.19**) 
8.748    
(1.05) 
  
SSH 
-4.959             
(-0.76) 
-3.811                 
(-0.64) 
7.362       
(1.03) 
2.289    
(0.39) 
2.221    
(0.38) 
  
YEAR 
-2.073              
(-0.41) 
3.140            
(0.62) 
1.451       
(0.24) 
-3.701         
(-0.71) 
-5.237         
(-1.00) 
  
MAIR 
-0.157              
(-2.65***) 
        0.0557 
P/E   
0.085       
(4.03***) 
      0.1167 
LNSIZE     
4.564       
(1.15) 
    0.0139 
ROA       
0.860 
(1.95*) 
  0.0326 
M/B         
-4.096           
(-2.72***) 
0.0587 
              
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
When the holding period is increased by 6 more months (12 months in total) the 
importance of variables starts to change. Market-adjusted initial returns and P/E ratios 
both are still significant, though started to decrease slightly as their explanatory power 
weakens also. Instead, M/B ratio and return on assets have become more important with 
higher significance and greater coefficients, offering increased explanatory power. This 
might describe that markets are giving more value to fundamental capabilities on longer 
run, and the explanatory power of different variables is time-dependent. When the 
speculation and fads starts to fall, valuation of companies is more likely based on their 
profitability and chances to grow, hence companies with reasonable level of valuation 
(M/B) and better profitability are generating better returns in the future. The size of the 
issuance gained some statistical significance, although not reaching even the level of 10 
% statistical significance. Despite the extended observation period, the differences 
between stock exchanges and issuing years remained relatively similar – as insignificant. 
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Table 10. OLS Regression results of 12-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. Individual independent variables with SSH & 
YEAR dummy. 
              
  
Coeff.      
(t-value) 
        R-square 
Intercept 
-9.819          
(-1.38) 
-15.523               
(-2.17**) 
-153.06         
(-1.44) 
-20.479         
(-2.45**) 
14.869   
(1.45) 
  
SSH 
-8.648           
(-1.05) 
-7.085                 
(-0.95) 
6.851       
(0.77) 
-0.675           
(-0.09) 
-0.666           
(-0.09) 
  
YEAR 
-1.696           
(-0.26) 
4.064          
(0.64) 
3.438      
(0.46) 
-4.368           
(-0.68) 
-6.301          
(-0.98) 
  
MAIR 
-0.179           
(-2.42**) 
        0.0446 
P/E   
0.094     
(3.53***) 
      0.0901 
LNSIZE     
6.685      
(1.35) 
    0.0148 
ROA       
1.390           
(-2.45**) 
  0.0497 
M/B         
-5.929          
(-3.21***) 
0.0754 
              
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
On a 2-year holding period all independent variables except size are statistically 
significant, at least on 5 % level. The significance of market-adjusted initial returns and 
P/E ratios rose substantially and their explanatory power increased more than trice 
(similar findings as Song, Tan & Yi 2014 received), as the significance of ROA and M/B 
ratios decreased, however all of them still being very significant. The dummy could not 
account for any meaningful differences between stock exchanges, even though the 
holding period was twice longer in this regression. Interestingly, the size of the issuance 
did not gain any significance but the dummy variable accounting for issuing years 
received very strong statistical significance suggesting the issuing year to be highly 
significant. Contradictorily, these findings about the size are not in line with results 
offered by Su and Bangassa (2011b), who also found that larger size of an IPO indicated 
better aftermarket performance during 2001–2006. Size of the issuance has received 
rather robust and similar results in earlier studies in all markets, Aggarwal and Rivoli 
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(1990) & Ritter (1991) found that weaker long-term performance is more severe problem 
among smaller companies, as both examined U.S. IPOs, as did Cai and Wei (1997) with 
Japanese IPOs.  
Table 11. OLS Regression results of 24-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. Individual independent variables with SSH & 
YEAR dummy.  
              
  
Coeff.    
(t-value) 
        R-square 
Intercept 
-23.267        
(-2.16**) 
-35.067        
(-3.30***) 
30.166 
(0.18) 
-38.162          
(-2.94***) 
1.604      
(0.09) 
  
SSH 
-4.716         
(-0.37) 
-0.509          
(-0.04)  
12.629 
(0.91) 
13.488 
(1.19) 
13.981 
(1.22) 
  
YEAR 
44.598 
(4.65***) 
56.599 
(5.96***) 
42.986 
(3.71***) 
40.810 
(4.09***) 
40.227 
(3.96***)   
MAIR 
-0.391          
(-3.49***) 
        0.2128 
P/E   
0.197 
(4.94***) 
      0.2763 
LNSIZE     
-2.413            
(-0.31) 
    0.1377 
ROA       
2.008 
(2.381**) 
  0.1739 
M/B         
-5.776         
(-1.96**) 
0.1626 
              
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
Due to this dubious contradiction regarding to the size of the issuance, I ran the 
regressions without YEAR-dummy, and the results indicated that bigger IPOs performed 
worse in the long-term than their smaller corresponding counterparts, with 5 % 
significance level. The interpretation of these contradictory results (no support for size, 
difference between issuing years, negative relationship if years are not controlled) can be 
explained. IPOs issued in 2012 experienced strong positive 2-year holding period returns, 
however, as the descriptive statistics already revealed, the average size of an IPO was 
almost half smaller as in previous years. Smaller companies also have higher beta and 
their stocks are more volatile than stocks of larger companies. The surge in 2014 and 
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small sample size distort these results, yet controlling the regression with issuing years 
captures the phenomena rather well. Despite that, the results about the size of an issuance 
cannot be considered completely robust. YEAR-dummy is extremely significant in each 
regression, with a positive relationship on long-term performance, suggesting that the 
market conditions highly affect on the performance of IPOs. 
Table 12. OLS Regression results of 36-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. Individual independent variables with SSH & 
YEAR dummy.  
              
  
Coeff.    
(t-value) 
        R-square 
Intercept 
-41.090       
(-2.44**) 
62.156          
(-3.79***) 
199.811 
(0.76) 
-49.126      
(-2.35**) 
-1.005        
(-0.03) 
  
SSH 
6.436    
(0.33) 
13.001     
(0.76) 
29.793 
(1.37) 
39.592 
(2.16**) 
38.960 
(2.15**) 
  
YEAR 
53.645 
(3.57***) 
74.991 
(5.12***) 
45.659 
(2.49**) 
51.419 
(3.21***) 
46.661 
(2.91***)   
MAIR 
-0.678         
(-3.87***) 
        0.1954 
P/E   
0.351 
(5.712***) 
      0.2844 
LNSIZE     
-11.071     
(-0.91)     
    0.1064 
ROA       1.299 (0.95)   0.107 
M/B         
-9.265        
(-1.99**) 
0.1279 
              
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
Results on the 3-year holding period return are mostly in line with previous regressions 
about shorter holding periods. Throughout all regressions and variables, the only 
significant differences between exchanges are found when then 3-year holding period 
return is explained with the return on assets and market-to-book ratios, suggesting that it 
is more important factor in Shenzhen than in Shanghai. In all regressions the YEAR-
dummy is still highly significant, even though those have fractionally weakened. This 
emphasizes that year of issuing (in this study pursues to capture the market conditions) 
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has strong explanatory power, and the market conditions are well captured with the 
dummy, as the weakening of dummy is in line with weakening of wealth relatives 
(presented in table 7).    
Main results from this holding period indicate the significance and explanatory power of 
market-adjusted initial returns and P/E ratios rose substantially during the last year. 
Theory and rationale consider the future uncertainty to be increased as the time period is 
extended, consequently these hikes cannot be interpreted unambiguously. Being 
consistent with theory, the statistical significance of return on assets and M/B ratios 
decreased, and the first one lost its significance completely. After the results of 2-year 
holding period return, it is not surprising that the slope coefficient and significance of the 
size rose, as the time period is longer and accounts for more of the markets’ surge, 
however still not receiving any statistical support.    
When the explanatory power, significance and slope coefficients of independent variables 
are compared during different holding periods, the figures are mostly confusing and 
irrational. When the holding period is short, the explanatory power and significance are 
substantially weaker than in longer periods. As previously mentioned, forecasting and 
predicting aftermarket performance should get harder and more inaccurate when the time 
period is longer. On the other hand, as fads hypothesis suggests, in the short run the 
pricing of stocks is inefficient due to the existence of speculative and irrationally behaving 
investors. Hence, investors act irrationally and forecasting prices with linear model is 
inaccurate. As the fads among recently issued IPOs weaken, and the behavior of investors 
becomes more rational, the model gains power again. 
Due to the similar results in each era, I conclude the market-adjusted initial returns, M/B 
ratios and pre-issue P/E ratios to be the best predictors for the long-term performance. 
These all can be considered as proxies for the valuation of stock, hence the level of 
valuation seems to account the most in the short- and long-term. The strongest support 
was received by P/E ratio, indicating that as called “growth stocks” performed the best, 
in every era.  However, these results can only be considered as directional due to the small 
sample size and market conditions, as it also needs to be remembered that only 18 of these 
131 issued IPOs experienced positive market-adjusted initial returns, results being 
strongly contradictory with more comprehensive studies.    
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Table 13. OLS Regression results of 6-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. 
              
  Coeff.     t-value   Coeff.     t-value   
Intercept -23.368 -0.26   -7.012 -0.08   
LNSIZE 0.443 0.106   0.075 0.01   
ROA 0.667 1.46   0.775 1.81*   
MAIR -0.139 -2.25**         
SSH -4.134 -0.50   -4.313 -0.61   
YEAR -3.058 -0.49   -1.546 -0.25   
P/E       0.078 3.73***   
M/B       -3.468 -2.39**   
R-square     0.0734     0.1796 
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
As the correlation matrix revealed, some of the independent variables have high 
correlation which might cause multicollinearity in results, I constructed two alternative 
models explaining the long-term performance.  
The first model explaining the 6-month holding period returns has relatively low 
explanatory power, barely exceeding 7 %. Neither the size of the issuance nor the return 
on assets were able to explain the performance, as only market-adjusted initial returns 
were statistically significant at 5 % level and supporting the theory that high initial returns 
indicate worse aftermarket performance. The alternative model, which does not account 
for the market-adjusted initial returns has substantially better explanatory power (over 10 
%), as it also has one independent variable more. Price-to-earnings ratio was able to 
explain the 6-month performance at 1 % level, as M/B ratio had also good explanatory 
power, while the return on assets had only moderate capability in explaining the long-
term performance. Neither of the models were able to capture differences between issuing 
years nor stock exchanges.   
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Table 14. OLS Regression results of 12-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. 
              
  Coeff.     t-value   Coeff.     t-value   
Intercept -45.034 -0.41   -6.481 -0.06   
LNSIZE 1.200 0.23   0.113 0.02   
ROA 1.165 2.07**   1.295 2.45**   
MAIR -0.146 -1.91*         
SSH -6.707 -0.66   -7.915 -0.91   
YEAR -3.093 -0.41   -3.288 -0.43   
P/E       0.083 3.21***   
M/B       -5.246 -2.94***   
R-square     0.0804     0.1914 
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
According to the correlation matrix, there is statistically a small correlation between 
market-adjusted initial returns and return on assets ratios. In the previous regression it did 
not disturb the model, as in this, the market-adjusted initial returns lose significance 
substantially, as return on assets gain. Otherwise the results are similar with earlier 
models, with the explanatory power of model being slightly better. As in with 6-month 
holding period return, the subsequent model is again better and more accurate in 
explaining the performance. P/E ratios and M/B ratios are highly significant at 1 % level. 
Return on assets is significant in both models at 5 % level, however in neither of the 
models, the size, issuing years and issuing exchange were significant.  
Even though in both models and in both time periods the marked-adjusted initial returns, 
P/E ratios, and M/B ratios are greatly significant in explaining the current aftermarket 
performance, the slope coefficients are low. For example, even if the P/E ratio of an 
issuing company would be 100, its effect on 12-month performance would be only 8 %. 
Correspondingly, the slope coefficient of -5,2 for M/B ratios is small, since the variety of 
M/B ratios is also small, as in with market-adjusted initial returns. Hence, the results 
confirm that these variables in general have a strong probability in affecting on the long-
term performance, however the effects themselves are not substantial.      
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Table 15. OLS Regression results of 24-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. 
              
  Coeff.     t-value   Coeff.     t-value   
Intercept 270.66 1.64   242.44 1.55   
LNSIZE -14.390 -1.86*   -12.759 -1.77*   
ROA 1.939 2.29**   2.215 2.78***   
MAIR -0.404 -3.35***         
SSH -20.805 -1.37   -14.829 -1.13   
YEAR 29.884 2.62***   38.133 3.35***   
P/E       0.189 4.87***   
M/B       -5.032 -1.87*   
R-square     0.2551     0.3375 
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
Observing the results of 24-month holding period returns reveals the previously discussed 
problem. When more variables were included to the model, the size of the issuance 
receives unreliable results, as the YEAR dummy in no more able to capture the market 
conditions. Hence, both models falsely signal the bigger IPOs experience worse 
aftermarket performance than smaller ones. Significance of return on assets is greater in 
both models, than in single model where it was only moderately significant, and 
depending on the model its significance is either at 5 % level, or at 1 % level. There is a 
high probability that multicollinearity or market conditions disturb the ratios in the first 
model, since the coefficients and significances of YEAR dummy have weakened 
meaningfully in both models. Increased explanatory power in both models, as well as 
increases in coefficients and t-values of P/E ratios, and in market-adjusted initial returns 
suggest there exists fads during longer time periods as well.       
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Table 16. OLS Regression results of 36-month market-adjusted holding period 
return as the dependent variable. 
              
  Coeff.     t-value   Coeff.     t-value   
Intercept 541.25 2.08**   465.40 1.91*   
LNSIZE -27.513 -2.26**   -23.621 -2.09**   
ROA 1.180 0.88   1.692 1.35   
MAIR -0.763 -4.22***         
SSH -25.466 -1.06   -12.121 -0.59   
YEAR 30.510 1.69*   47.107 2.64***   
P/E       0.344 5.66***   
M/B       -8.011 -1.90*   
R-square     0.2278     0.3259 
              
*     statistically significant at 0.10 level 
**   statistically significant at 0.05 level 
*** statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
Examining the 3-year aftermarket performance supports previous findings about biased 
results in the size of the issuance. In both models its significance is on higher level and 
the coefficients doubled. Unexpectedly, in the first model the issuing year has a rather 
weak explanatory power, and in the other the issuing year is still very significant. Since 
there is no strong relationship in the first model, it can be concluded that the market-
adjusted initial returns (level of pricing) have the best explanatory power in the 3-year 
holding period, despite the market conditions. The latter regression on the other hand 
strongly supports the market conditions to be important, and P/E ratios as well. Even on 
longer run, it seems the companies are experiencing rather similar long-term returns 
which are not dependable on the issuing stock exchange. These results also conclude that 
return on assets is insignificant in explaining 3-year aftermarket performance.    
Based on analyzing all the data above, I confirm the third hypothesis. Chinese IPOs are 
poor long-term (3-year) investment. 85 of all 131 companies underperformed the 
benchmark, as only 47 outperformed it. 17 of these outperforming IPOs were issued in 
2010, which also suggest that the market conditions are the most important factors in 
explaining the long-term performance of IPOs in China. However, even though the 
sample is small and only 18 companies generated positive market-adjusted initial returns 
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these results can be considered moderately robust. 113 companies had negative returns 
on the first trading day, and as all previous researches from 21st century and this confirms 
that there is strong negative relationship between first day returns and long-term 
performance. Even now when the sample is mostly full of companies with negative first 
day returns, which based on empirical researches should perform better in the long-term, 
they still underperform the markets. Consequently, if the sample would contain more 
companies, and as Song et al. (2014) already confirmed that the initial returns are positive 
with the entire sample, the average long-term performance of the entire set of companies 
should be even weaker.    
Hypotheses four and five are both confirmed, in every time period the market-adjusted 
initial returns had statistically very strong negative relationship with long-term 
performance, however, its affects are not superior. This supports all theories that high 
initial returns indicate about the worse long-term performance and vice versa. Price-to-
earnings ratio had statistically the strongest and positive relationship with long-term 
performance throughout all regressions and time periods, suggesting that the growth 
companies have higher probability to perform better in the long-term. Although, the 
coefficients of P/E ratios were rather small as well.  
Market-to-book ratio has been statistically better in explaining the short-term 
performance, as its significance weakens in longer periods, though having higher 
explanatory power in longer periods. Return on assets’ ability to indicate short- and long-
term performance is only moderate, by being best in explaining the 1- and 2-year holding 
period returns, yet being unable to explain 6-month nor 36-month returns. Nevertheless, 
the dependency is positive and supports the existing theory and previous findings that 
more profitable companies have better performance. However, profitability is also time-
dependent, previous success does not solely guarantee success in the future, therefore it 
loses it prediction power in the longer time period.  
Size of the issuance received no statistical support. Previous researches from the globe 
consider the relatively larger size on an issuance will result better aftermarket 
performance in the long-term. However, with this sample of Chinese IPOs there was no 
statistical dependency between the size and aftermarket performance. Conducting the 
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research with more comprehensive set of companies might result in different kind of 
results, though with this small sample there was no dependency. 
 
8.4. Limitations 
As limitations, the market conditions made the measuring and defining of important 
determinants of long-term performance challenging. The rapid surge in mid-2014 
disturbed measuring the general long-term performance of IPOs, as well as regressing the 
variables, resulting in biased figures regarding to the size of the issuance. The linear 
model is not the most accurate in defining the significance levels of variables in these 
circumstances, as more superior models are required for that purpose. Conducting the 
study with dataset covering only 12,04 % of issued companies might result more truthful 
results, if all variables are normally distributed. However, this study investigated all IPOs 
with data available from Thomson Reuters Datastream. There are some uncertainties 
related to most of the results since the data covered mostly IPOs with negative initial 
returns and the distribution of IPOs between issuing years far from normally distributed.  
As second steps and improvements for further researches to be conducted in China’s IPO 
markets I suggest and alternative method for defining the benchmarks. Since the level of 
efficiency of Chinese stock markets is continuously questioned, a model which accounts 
for this is required. As commonly known, the more traded the stocks are, the better is the 
efficiency of pricing. Thus, stocks which trading volumes are higher receive more 
attention at the markets. The more there are investors submitting quotes regarding to the 
stock, the more efficient the pricing is. Trading volumes are also a common measure of 
liquidity, and liquidity risk (premium) have been able to explain the variance of returns 
since the investors requires return for illiquidity (Liu 2006). Hence I consider the 
benchmark should be built from matching firms by applying the commonly known 
methods (assets, proxy for profitability, B/M, P/E, industry), and including a proxy for 
liquidity and efficiency. For each IPO in the sample, the should be an equally weighted 
portfolio of matching firms with monthly rebalancing. Small companies might face zero 
trading days, and correspondingly there might also be days when the stocks are heavily 
traded, therefore the most suitable proxy would be trading volume of one week divided 
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by five, simultaneously applying some kind of confidence intervals for the proxies. This 
would be more appropriate method for finding the matching firms, since there are not 
completely similar firms with all these features. With this approach, the long-term 
performance of an IPO company can be reasonably evaluated. As a result, there would be 
a portfolio of matching firms with relatively similar fundaments and which stocks are 
priced relatively similarly (efficiently of inefficiently, rough approach to trading volume 
and liquidity), thus the relevant benchmark is complete. Examining the long-term 
performance would not be so easily disturbed by market conditions since similar 
companies tend to have rather similar reactions regarding to market movements. 
However, researching the long-term performance would also require better proxies for 
market conditions, especially in volatile circumstances. 
If conducted with multiple OLS regression, buy-and-hold period returns or wealth 
relatives could be still used as dependent variable, however the independent variables 
would be quite similar as in this study, except some of them would be representing 
differences. Independent variables would be: market-adjusted initial returns, delta ROA 
(difference between past and present, proxy for profitability), delta EPS (difference 
between past and present, proxy for earnings), proxy for investor sentiment (for example 
delta “Chinese VIX”, difference between past 3 or 6 months to present), proxy for 
movements in market conditions (SHZE & SHSE difference between past 3 or 6 months 
to present), proxy for investor activity & hot market conditions (trading volume 
difference, between past 3 to 6 months to present, accounts for both Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges) and the size of the issuance. Preferably, data would cover all issued 
A-series IPOs at least from 5 years, while the markets should be in a relatively steady 
conditions. 
Although there is a question arising – is this just unnecessary datamining? With this 
portfolio of matching firms, data from different parts of the past and future are needed in 
order to evaluate the performance of IPO firms. After completing and analyzing all 
regressions, worthless variables should be excluded, stepwisely test alternatives and 
eventually construct a model which can be used for business purposes: for forecasting 
and predicting, not just for finding dependencies from the past and considering if IPOs 
have been underpriced and had poor long-term performance.     
93 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the level of initial returns and long-term 
performance of Chinese A-series IPOs. The initial returns have historically been the 
highest in China’s domestic stock markets, in comparison to all other markets. Even 
though previous researches show the level of initial returns has decreased over the time, 
the initial returns have still been substantial in the 21st century. Research data cover 131 
initial public offerings issued in 2010–2012, accounting for total of 12,04 % of all issued 
initial public offerings. This research period was chosen due to the changes in regulatory 
environment, and as pursuing the most recent information from the long-term 
performance. Previously the pricing of initial public offerings was regulated with price-
to-earnings ratio based ceiling, which did not allow the ratio to exceed 15. However, this 
was deregulated in June 2009, making the pricing floating. Hence, this is the first study 
which observes the long-term performance of issued initial public offerings only after the 
regulatory change.  
The initial returns were calculated as the percentages changes from the primary market 
price to the first day close price, afterwards adjusted with market movements in order to 
test the statistical significance of these abnormal returns, which was tested with Student’s 
t-test. The long-term performance and abnormal returns were defined as the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold period returns of 6, 12, 24 and 36 months. The used benchmarks 
were SSH & SSE Composite indices, which account for all A-series stocks in either 
Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange, depending on the Index. The statistical 
significance of abnormal returns was tested with t-test. Regression analyses were used to 
test the statistical significance of firm specific characteristics and examine the cross-
sectional patterns.     
This study has five hypotheses. The first one assumes the level of initial returns is highly 
positive and significant, while the second states that the level of initial returns has 
weakened significantly during the research period. Due to the small research sample, 
resulting in biased results, I am not able to confirm or reject the two first hypotheses. 
Third hypothesis suggest that the Chinese initial public offerings are poor long-term 
investment, which is documented in this study and thus confirmed. Hypothesis four 
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assumes the market-adjusted initial returns have statistically strong and negative 
relationship between the long-term performance, as hypothesis five considers the price-
to-earnings ratio has statistically strong relationship between the long-term performance. 
Both subsequent hypotheses are confirmed in this study, as the market-adjusted initial 
returns had statistically strong and negative relationship with the long-term performance, 
while the price-to-earnings ratio had statistically strong and positive relationship with the 
long-term performance. This suggests the initial public offerings with high market-
adjusted initial returns had weaker long-term performance, as initial public offerings with 
high pre-issue price-to-earnings ratio were more likely to obtain better long-term 
performance.  
Firm specific characteristics at the time of the issuance are able to explain the long-term 
performance, however, not comprehensively. Based on the research circumstances and 
the empirical results, the market conditions can be considered to be the most important 
factor over the others in explaining the aftermarket performance of Chinese initial public 
offerings. Further research with more accurate long-term performance measures, with 
more comprehensive sample is required in order to receive completely robust results.  
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APPENDIX 
The companies included into the research sample: 
Company Year Company Year 
Anhui Xinhua Media Co Ltd 2010 Nanjing Sciyon Automation Grp 2010 
Shenzhen Selen Sci & Tech Co 2010 Beijing Unistrong Science 2010 
Haining China Leather Market 2010 Beijing Haohua Energy Resource 2010 
Juli Sling Co Ltd 2010 Suzhou Dongshan Precision Mnfr 2010 
Zhejiang Chint Electrics Co 2010 Shenzhen Sunyes Electn Mnfg 2010 
Guangdong CHJ Industry Co Ltd 2010 Zhejiang Nanyang Technology co 2010 
Shanghai Zhezhong Co Ltd 2010 Guizhou Xinbang Pharm Co Ltd 2010 
Beijing Creative Distn 2010 Jiangsu Changqing Agrochemical 2010 
Goldlok Toys Holdings Co Ltd 2010 Beijing Lier High Temperature 2010 
China XD Electric Co Ltd 2010 Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd 2010 
Edifier Technology Co Ltd 2010 Hunan Mendale Hometextile Co 2010 
Maanshan Dingtai Rare Earth 2010 Wuxi Double Elephant Micro 2010 
China Erzhong Group(Deyang) 2010 Guangdong Advertising Co Ltd 2010 
Shandong Xingmin Wheel Co ltd 2010 Xiamen Academy of Bldg 2010 
Shenzhen Haoningda Meter Co 2010 Shenzhen H&T Intelligent 2010 
Henan Senyuan Electric Co Ltd 2010 Zhejiang Aishida Electric Co 2010 
Shandong Qixing Iron Tower 2010 Zhejiang Jiaxin Silk Corp Ltd 2010 
Sichuan Fulin Transportation 2010 NavInfo Co Ltd 2010 
Anhui Shenjian New Materials 2010 Xuchang Yuandong Drive Shaft 2010 
Hanwang Technology Co Ltd 2010 Zibo Qixiang Tengda Chem Co 2010 
Shanxi Tond Chemical Co Ltd 2010 Glodon Software Co Ltd 2010 
Befar Group Co Ltd 2010 Shenzhen Aisidi Co Ltd 2010 
Qianjiang Yongan Pharm Co Ltd 2010 Fujian Sunnada Commun Co Ltd 2010 
Shandong Longji Mach Co Ltd 2010 Rainbow Department Store Co 2010 
Sichuan Danfu Compressor Co 2010 Zhongyuan Special Steel Co Ltd 2010 
Beijing Sevenstar Electro Co 2010 Kaiser(China)Hldg Co Ltd 2010 
Zhejiang Yatai Pharma Co Ltd 2010 Andon Health Co Ltd 2010 
Shandong Lipeng Co Ltd 2010 Zhejiang Wanliyang 2010 
Zhejiang Weixing New Bldg Co 2010 Fujian Star Net Communication 2010 
Hubei Guochuang Hi-tech 2010 Harbin Gloria Pharm Co Ltd 2010 
Shandong New Beiyang Info tech 2010 Jiangsu Shentong Valve Co Ltd 2010 
Zhejiang Yasha Decoration Co 2010 Qinhuangdao Tianye Tolian 2010 
Guangdong Sky Dragon Printing 2010 Jiangsu Tongding Optic-Electn 2010 
Chongqing Water Group Co Ltd 2010 Yotrio Group Co Ltd 2010 
Chongyi Zhangyuan Tungsten Co 2010 Zhejiang Jingu Co Ltd 2010 
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Company Year Company Year 
Anhui Honglu Steel Constr 
 
2011 
 
Suzhou Yangtze New 
Materials 
2012 
 
Anhui Sierte Fertilizer Ind Co 2011 Beijing Philisense Tech Co Ltd 2012 
Jiangsu Asia-Pacific Light 2011 SJEC Corp 2012 
Shindoo Chem-Ind Co Ltd 2011 Shenzhen Mason Tech Co Ltd 2012 
Sinovel Wind Group Co Ltd 2011 Beijing Leadman Biochemistry 2012 
Shenzhen Dvision Video 
Commun 
2011 
 
Bringspring Science&Tech Co 
 
2012 
 
GCI Science & Tech Co Ltd 2011 Shandong Gettop Acoustic Co 2012 
Guangdong Vanward New Elec 
Co 
2011 
 
Shantou Dongfeng Printing Co 
 
2012 
 
Hand Enterprise Solutions Co 2011 Jishi Media Co Ltd 2012 
Shanghai Tofflon Science&Tech 2011 Universal Scientific 2012 
Qingdao East Steel Tower Stock 2011 Sinodata Co Ltd 2012 
Guangdong Hongteo Accurate 2011 Jiangsu Zhongtai Bridge Steel 2012 
SF Diamond Co Ltd 2011 Kemen Noodle Mnfr Co Ltd 2012 
Shenzhen Tempus Global Travel 2011 Xin Zhi Motor Co Ltd 2012 
Changzhou Xingyu Automotive 
 
2011 
 
Pubang Landscape 
Architecture 
2012 
 
Shanghai Guangdian Elec Grp 
Co 
2011 
 
Fuchun Communications Co 
Ltd 
2012 
 
Huafon Microfibre (Shanghai) 2011 Jiangsu Yunyi Electric Co Ltd 2012 
Zhejiang Jolly Pharm Co Ltd 2011 Toyou Feiji Electronics Co Ltd 2012 
Baoding Heavy Industry Co Ltd 2011 Beijing Shouhang Resources 2012 
China Oil HBP Science&Tech 
Co 
2011 
 
Hangzhou Everfine Photo-E-
Info 
2012 
 
Shenzhen Glory Medical Co Ltd 2011 Shandong Zhongji Electrical 2012 
Anhui Huilong Agricultural 
 
2011 
 
GuangDong HuaSheng 
Electrical 
2012 
 
Sanjiang Shopping Club Co Ltd 2011 Beijing Cuiwei Tower Co Ltd 2012 
Guangdong Dahuanong Animal 
 
2011 
 
Zhejiang Jingsheng 
Mechanical 
2012 
 
Tongyu Heavy Industry Co Ltd 2011 Epoxy Base Electn Material 2012 
Xiamen Meiya Pico Info Co Ltd 2011 Jiangsu Dewei Advanced 2012 
Shenzhen Techand 
Ecology&Envi 
2011 
 
Bros Eastern Co Ltd 
 
2012 
 
Staidson (Beijing) Biopharm Co 2011 Jiangmen Kanhoo Ind Co Ltd 2012 
Jiangsu Tongda Power Tech Co 2011 Jinzhou New China Dragon 2012 
Jiangsu Yitong High-tech Co 2011     
Tongkun Group Co Ltd 2011     
Luoyang North Glass Tech Co 2011     
 
